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I use readability scores to test if referees and/or editors apply higher standards
to women’s writing in academic peer review. I ﬁnd: (i) female-authored papers
are 1–6 percent better written than equivalent papers by men; (ii) the gap is two
times higher in published articles than in earlier, draft versions of the same pa-
pers; (iii) women’s writing gradually improves but men’s does not—meaning the
readability gap grows over authors’ careers. In a dynamic model of an author’s
decision-making process, I show that tougher editorial standards and/or biased
referee assignment are uniquely consistent with this pattern of choices. A conser-
vative causal estimate derived from the model suggests senior female economists
write at least 9 percent more clearly than they otherwise would. These ﬁnd-
ings indicate that higher standards burden women with an added time tax and
probably contribute to academia’s “Publishing Paradox”. Consistent with this
hypothesis, I ﬁnd female-authored papers spend six months longer in peer re-
view. More generally, tougher standards impose a quantity/quality tradeoﬀ that
characterises many instances of female output. They could resolve persistently
lower—otherwise unexplained—female productivity in many high-skill occupa-
tions.
1 Introduction
Ladies, we aren’t that common in economics. Only a third, ﬁfth and tenth of assistant,
associate and full professors, respectively, are women (Romero, 2013). Female economists
are less likely to make tenure, take longer when they do and earn much less than their male
peers (Bandiera, 2016; Ceci et al., 2014; Ginther and Kahn, 2004; Weisshaar, 2017).1
These statistics are uncomfortable, but their causes are myriad: lower publishing rates,
career choices, motherhood and, probably, bias. In lab experiments women are subject
to tougher standards. Their qualiﬁcations and ability are underestimated (Foschi, 1996;
Grunspan et al., 2016; Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Reuben et al., 2014). Female-authored
manuscripts are evaluated more critically (Goldberg, 1968; Krawczyk and Smyk, 2016;
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1Weisshaar (2017) evaluates the probability of making tenure in Sociology, Computer Science and English
departments. She ﬁnds female academics’ lower productivity contributes to—but does not fully explain—
tenure gaps in those ﬁelds.
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Paludi and Bauer, 1983); when collaborating with men, women are given less credit (Heil-
man and Haynes, 2005; Sarsons, 2016).
This paper uses ﬁve reliable measures of writing clarity to show that women are like-
wise held to higher standards in peer review. (i) Female-authored articles published in top
economics journals are better written than similar papers by men. The diﬀerence cannot be
explained by year, journal, editor, topic, institution, English language ability or with various
proxies for article quality and author productivity. (ii) The gap widens precisely while papers
are being reviewed. I compare published articles to their pre-reviewed drafts. Forty per-
cent of the gap originates during peer review. (iii) Female economists improve their writing;
male economists don’t. A dynamic model of an author’s decision-making process shows that
tougher editorial standards and/or biased referee assignment are the only explanations con-
sistent with this pattern of choices. Using a conservative measure derived from the model, I
estimate that this type of discrimination causes senior female economists to write at least 9
percent more clearly than they otherwise would. Finally, (iv) higher standards mean longer
review—and as anticipated, female-authored papers take six months longer to complete peer
review. This estimate is based on submit-accept times at Econometrica, and controls for, inter
alia, motherhood, childbirth, citations and ﬁeld.
Higher standards impose a quantity/quality tradeoﬀ that likely contributes to academia’s
“Publishing Paradox” and “Leaky Pipeline”.2 Spending more time revising old research
means spending less time conducting new research. Fewer papers results in fewer promo-
tions, possibly driving women into fairer ﬁelds. Moreover, evidence of this tradeoﬀ is present
in a variety of occupations—e.g., doctors, real estate agents and airline pilots—suggesting
higher standards distort women’s productivity, more generally.
Prior research indicates journal acceptance rates are genuinely bias-free (see, e.g., Blank,
1991; Borsuk et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 1994).3 To the best of my knowledge, however, gen-
der neutrality is established in only a narrow context (publication outcomes) using this single
indicator. I ask a diﬀerent question. Men’s and women’s papers may be published at compa-
rable rates, but are they reviewed with comparable scrutiny? For, if women are stereotypically
assumed less capable at math, logic and reasoning than men and generally need more ev-
idence to rate as equally competent, some well-intentioned referees might (unknowingly)
inspect their papers more closely, demand a larger number of revisions and, in general, be
less tolerant of complicated, dense writing.
Complicated, dense writing is my focus. In the English language, more clearly written
prose is better prose, all things equal. Thoughtful word choice and simple sentence structure
make text easier to understand, more interesting to read and expose inconsistencies long-
winded writing often hides. Journal editors tend to agree—Econometrica asks authors to
write “crisply but clearly” and to take “the extra eﬀort involved in revising and reworking the
manuscript until it will be clear to most if not all of our readers” (Econometrica submission
guidelines, June 2016).4
2“Publishing Paradox” and “Leaky Pipeline” refer to phenomena in academia whereby women publish fewer
papers and disproportionately leave the profession, respectively.
3A possible exception is Behavioral Ecology, which increased its number of female ﬁrst-authored papers after
switching to double-blind review in 2001 (Budden et al., 2008a). Whether that increase was due to bias or the
universal upward trend in female authorship, however, has been somewhat controversial (Budden et al., 2008b;
Budden et al., 2008c; Webb et al., 2008; Whittaker, 2008).
4The American Economic Review rejected Robert Lucas’s paper “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” for
insuﬃcient readability; one referee wrote “If it has a clear result, it is hidden by the exposition” (Gans and
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If referees hold female- and male-authored papers to identical standards, both should
be equally well written. To test this, I rely on a relationship familiar to linguists and edu-
cators: simple vocabulary and short sentences are easier to understand and straightforward
to quantify. Using the ﬁve most widely used, studied and reliable formulas to exploit this,
I analyse 9,123 article abstracts5 published in the American Economic Review (AER), Econo-
metrica (ECA), Journal of Political Economy (JPE) and Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE).6
Female-authored abstracts are 1–6 percent more readable than those by men. Women
write better despite controls for editor, journal, year and primary and tertiary JEL classiﬁ-
cation; that remains unchanged when proxying for article and author quality or accounting
for English ﬂuency. This means the readability gap probably wasn’t (i) a response to speciﬁc
policies in earlier eras; (ii) caused by women writing on topics that are easier to explain;
(iii) due to a lopsided concentration of (non-)native English speakers;7 nor (iv) generated by
factors correlated with gender but really related to knowledge, intelligence and creativity.
Additionally, the gender readability gap widens during peer review. I compare National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working papers to their ﬁnal, published versions; the
gap is almost twice as large for the latter.8 While both papers are exposed to many factors
that impact readability, only published articles are subject to peer review. By comparing the
two, inﬂuences unrelated to immediate peer review are isolated from those that are; assuming
the former are not correlated with the latter’s timing, a widening gap suggests a causal link.
Revising, redrafting and selecting just the right word is hard work; making sentences
even marginally more readable takes time. Consistent with this hypothesis, I ﬁnd female-
authored papers spend six months longer in peer review. This estimate is based on submit-
accept times from Econometrica, persists across a range of speciﬁcations and, in addition to
other factors, controls for motherhood, childbirth, citations and ﬁeld.9
Two explanations could account for these ﬁndings: either women voluntarily write better
papers—e.g., because they’re more sensitive to referee criticism or overestimate the impor-
tance of writing well—or better written papers are women’s response to external thresholds
they do not control. Both imply women spend too much time rewriting old papers and not
enough time writing new papers—but my evidence suggests the latter is primarily to blame.
In a dynamic model of an author’s decision making process, I show that if women im-
prove their writing over time and are not commensurately rewarded with higher acceptance
rates (relative to men), then a persistent readability gap between equivalent peers is caused
by discrimination. Authors improve readability only if they believe better writing leads to
higher acceptance rates. And while oversensitivity and/or poor informationmay distort their
Shepherd, 1994, p. 172). In a random selection of 100 posts on Shit My Reviewers Say, a quarter deal with
writing quality, document structure or word choice/tone.
5Readability scores are highly correlated across an article’s abstract, introduction and discussion sections (Hartley
et al., 2003a). See Section 2 for further discussion.
6For a discussion on the reliability of readability formulas, see DuBay (2004) and Section 2.1. A sixth commonly
used measure is the Lexile Framework. Because its formula and software are proprietary, I do not include it in
the analysis.
7It is not clear how—or even if—native English speakers write more clearly than non-native speakers. In fact,
Hayden (2008) found that peer reviewed articles by the latter are more readable, on average.
8Many thanks to Kevin Schnepel for suggesting this idea.
9Predictably, giving birth slows down peer review. The coeﬃcient on motherhood, however, is consistently neg-
ative (indicating a productivity boost) and almost always highly signiﬁcant when subjected to several robustness
checks. This result is provocative and discussed in Section 3.5. I encourage interpreting it with caution, how-
ever, given (i) counterintuitive results; (ii) the analysis did not intend tomeasure motherhood’s impact on review
times; and especially (iii) only a small number of mothers with young children are published in Econometrica.
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beliefs—and aﬀect readability—the impact declines with experience. Holding acceptance
rates constant, this implies that a widening readability gap between equivalent authors is
caused by discrimination—i.e., asymmetric editorial standards and/or biased referee assign-
ment beyond their control (Theorem 1).
Theorem 1 establishes suﬃcient conditions to demonstrate double standards are present
in academic publishing: (i) experienced women write better than experienced men; (ii)
women improve their writing over time; (iii) female-authored papers are accepted no more
often than male-authored papers. Estimates from pooled subsamples at ﬁxed publication
counts suggest (i) and (ii) hold. On average, women’s writing gradually gets better but men’s
does not. Between authors’ ﬁrst and third published articles, the readability gap increases
by up to 12 percent. Although my data do not identify probability of acceptance, conclu-
sions from extensive study elsewhere are clear: “there are no sex diﬀerences in acceptance
rates.” (Ceci et al., 2014, p. 111; see also Section 3.4.3 for references to other research
supporting this claim).
I also match proliﬁc female authors to similarly productive male authors on characteris-
tics that predict the topic, novelty and quality of research. In addition to explicitly account-
ing for author equivalence—the (principle) conditional independence assumption behind
Theorem 1—matched pair comparisons: (i) identify the gender most likely to satisfy Theo-
rem 1‘s conditions simultaneously;10 and (ii) generate a (conservative) estimate of the eﬀect
of higher standards on authors’ readability (Corollary 1).
Theorem 1’s conditions were satisﬁed in 65 percent of matched pairs. In three quarters
of those, the member discriminated against was female. Moreover, instances of obvious
discrimination were predominately against women: the estimated eﬀect of higher standards
was almost twice as large in pairs suggesting discrimination against women; it clustered near
zero for the small minority of pairs indicating discrimination against men. On average,
higher standards cause senior female economists to write at least nine percent more clearly
than they otherwise would.11
Asymmetric editorial standards and/or biased referee assignment aﬀect women directly—
as already discussed, women write more readably during and spend longer in peer review.
They probably aﬀect women’s behaviour indirectly, too. As a ﬁnal exercise, I compare papers
pre- and post-review over increasing publication counts (Appendix A). In authors’ earliest
papers, the readability gap exclusively emerges during peer review; there is no gender diﬀer-
ence in the draft readability of authors’ ﬁrst top publication. In later papers, women write
well upfront; the gap chieﬂy materialises before peer review. This suggests that female econ-
omists adjust to higher standards in peer review by writing more clearly before peer review.
In economics, theoretical and empirical research on discrimination tends to focus on
stereotype formation and belief structures motivating discriminatory actions (e.g., Arrow,
1973; Becker, 1957; Bordalo et al., 2016; Coate and Loury, 1993; Phelps, 1972). This
paper exclusively explores, in a non-laboratory environment, discrimination’s impact on the
behaviour and choices of people discriminated against.
10Each of Theorem 1’s conditions must technically hold for the same author in two diﬀerent situations—before
and after gaining experience and when compared to an equivalent, experienced author of the opposite gender.
11While nine percent seems small, it is based on a single paragraph. Assuming a similar standard applies to
every paragraph in a paper and improving each one takes slightly more time, the accumulated impact may
be substantial. See also Berk et al. (2017) for a general discussion on how current culture may encourage
extraneous (and time-consuming) demands in otherwise publishable papers.
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This perspective has two advantages. First, it oﬀers an alternative framework for studying
the phenomenon. Discrimination is typically identiﬁed from the actions (e.g., Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark et al., 1996) and/or learning processes (e.g., Altonji and
Pierret, 2001; Fryer et al., 2013) of those who discriminate. Within a subjective expected
utility framework, I show that authors’ choices also reveal discrimination by editors and/or
referees. Although context-speciﬁc, the model’s basic logic—and its method of identifying
discrimination—apply equally well to situations where people are repeatedly judged on and
respond to feedback about some quantiﬁable component of their output.
Second, analysing discrimination from the perspective of people discriminated against
forces us to think more deeply about its impact on, inter alia, occupational choice, worker
motivation, human capital investment and, especially, productivity measurement. This paper
joins a small, emerging literature examining these eﬀects (e.g., Craig and Fryer, 2017; Glover
et al., 2017; Lavy and Sand, 2015; Parsons et al., 2011).12
Higher standards cause collateral damage to women’s productivity. Unequal time spent
making revisions leads to unequal time conducting new research; as a result, women write
fewer papers.13 Fewer papers justiﬁes lower promotion rates.14 If women seek fairer em-
ployment elsewhere—or quit the labour force entirely—it swells a “Leaky Pipeline”.
Moreover, I also ﬁnd evidence that female authors internalise tougher standards with
strategies that disguise the underlying discrimination as voluntary choice. Women increas-
ingly submit better written papers ex ante to oﬀset biased evaluation ex post, meaning the
readability gap between senior economists largely forms prior to—therefore appearing in-
dependent of—peer review. This pattern of behaviour obscures the line between personal
preferences and external constraints and hints that academia overlooks other biases within
its ranks.
Although analysed in a speciﬁc context—academia—higher standards impose a quantity
vs. quality tradeoﬀ that characterises many instances of female output. According to raw
numerical counts, women produce less than men. Female reporters write fewer front-page
bylines (Klos, 2014); female real estate agents list fewer homes (Seagraves and Gallimore,
2013); female physicians see fewer patients (Bloor et al., 2008)15 and submit fewer grant
proposals (Gordon et al., 2009); female pharmacists and lawyers work and bill fewer hours,
respectively (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Goldin and Katz, 2016).
When ranked by narrowly deﬁned outcome measures, however, women often outper-
form. Female students earn better grades (Voyer and Voyer, 2014); female auditors are more
accurate and eﬃcient (Chung and Monroe, 2001; Ittonen et al., 2013; Niskanen et al.,
2011; O’Donnell and Johnson, 2001); congresswomen secure more federal funding for their
12A parallel research thread examines the broader impact of external signals (discriminatory or not) on women’s
behaviour (Kugler et al., 2017).
13A similar idea was also recently proposed in the philosophy literature (see Bright, 2017; Lee, 2016).
14Evidence on whether female academics are hired and promoted at lower rates is mixed. One study suggests so-
called STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) ﬁelds actually prefer hiring women—although
male economists continue to show a slight (but not signiﬁcant) preference for men (Williams et al., 2015).
Other studies ﬁnd male candidates are preferred in postdoctoral research and laboratory management posi-
tions (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012; Sheltzer and Smith, 2014). Men are also more likely granted tenure when
compared to women with an identical publication history (Weisshaar, 2017) or for co-authored work (Sarsons,
2017). A study speciﬁc to the London School of Economics found female academics earn 12% less than men
with identical experience and research productivity (Bandiera, 2016).
15Bloor et al. (2008)’s analysis considers only full-time (or maximum part-time), salaried physicians in the U.K.
Similar results are found in Canada and the U.S., where physicians are paid on a per-service basis (Benedetti
et al., 2004; Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2005).
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districts, sponsor more legislation and score higher on a composite measure of legislative ef-
fectiveness (Anzia and Berry, 2011; Volden et al., 2013); houses listed by female real estate
agents sell for higher prices (Salter et al., 2012; Seagraves and Gallimore, 2013);16 patients
treated by female physicians are less likely to die or be readmitted to hospital (Tsugawa et al.,
2016); female pilots are involved in fewer fatal accidents (Bazargan and Guzhva, 2011; Vail
and Ekman, 1986);17 female economists write more clearly.
Additionally, if—like senior female economists—women internalise higher standards in
somewhat roundabout ways, they could contribute to other labour market phenomena: sec-
toral and occupational concentration (Blau and Kahn, 2016; Cortés and Pan, 2016; Pertold-
Gebicka et al., 2016); women’s tendency to under negotiate pay (Babcock and Laschever,
2003)18 and apply only to jobs they feel fully qualiﬁed for (Mohr, 2014). They may likewise
reinforce work habits—e.g., conscientiousness, tenacity and diligence—that correlate with
quality and connote “femininity”: female physicians consult longer with patients (Roter and
Hall, 2004); female politicians fundraise more intensely (Jenkins, 2007);19 female faculty
commit fewer instances of academic misconduct (Fang et al., 2013); female lawyers make
fewer ethical violations (Hatamyar and Simmons, 2004); female pharmacists are less likely
to face performance-related disciplinary action (Schafheutle et al., 2011).20
Higher standards therefore oﬀer another perspective to the gender gap in labour mar-
ket outcomes. Traditional hypotheses focus on obvious discrimination (Goldin and Rouse,
2000), motherhood (Bertrand et al., 2010) and diﬀerences in behaviour (e.g., Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2010). Contemporary theories stress inﬂexible working conditions (Goldin,
2014; Goldin and Katz, 2016), preferences (for a review, see, e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2016)
and policy design (Antecol et al., 2016). Still other research—which this paper joins—
target more subtle forms of discrimination (e.g., Sarsons, 2017; Wu, 2017). The gap proba-
bly emerges from all of these factors—and possibly many that are not yet identiﬁed. Equality
means levelling the playing ﬁeld for every one.
Furthermore, my results advocate using caution when employing shallow performance
indicators in equations relating earnings (or other labourmarket outcomes) to gender. Higher
standards raise quality at the expense of quantity. Performance indicators that weight the
latter’s fall more heavily than the former’s rise will appear artiﬁcially low. If used to interpret
gender wage gaps, they will undervalue women’s work and confound estimates of labourmar-
16Seagraves and Gallimore (2013) ﬁnd that normal houses (i.e. homes not sold under special sales conditions,
such as foreclosures, ﬁxer-uppers, corporate-owned properties, transfers and estate sales) sell at a signiﬁcantly
higher price when listed by a female real estate agent. The authors also ﬁnd buyers pay less if they are rep-
resented by a male agent—although the eﬀect is only present for homes sold under special sales conditions.
An earlier study did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant gender diﬀerence in selling performance for listing and selling
agents (Turnbull and Dombrow, 2007).
17The evidence on general accident rates (including non-fatal accidents) is mixed. McFadden (1996) found no
diﬀerence in female vs. male accident rates after adjusting for pilot experience and age. Walton and Politano
(2016) found female accident rates were higher than male accident rates among inexperienced pilots but lower
among experienced pilots.
18A more recent study suggests women do ask for higher pay—they just don’t get it (Artz et al., 2016).
19Female politicians target a larger variety of potential donors using a wider array of methods (direct mail,
television advertisements, etc.) (Jenkins, 2007).
20Evidence in several countries suggests female pharmacists are less likely to commit criminal oﬀenses (prescrip-
tion fraud, drug traﬃcking, etc.) and minor professional misdemeanours (inadequate written records, stock,
etc.) (Payne and Dabney, 1997; Tullett et al., 2003). Self-reported survey evidence does not suggest female
pharmacists make fewer dispensing errors (Szeinbach et al., 2007); evidence from a laboratory experiment
indicates the opposite (Family et al., 2013). Similar gender trends have been found for physicians, dentists
and other medical professionals (for a review of studies and discussion, see Firth-Cozens, 2008).
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ket discrimination. A similar argument was recently made in a study of racial preferences
in Major League Baseball. Parsons et al. (2011) ﬁnd that race aﬀects umpire calls, um-
pire calls inﬂuence players’ behaviour and players’ behaviour impacts performance metrics.
As a result, common baseball statistics underestimate the talent of disadvantaged (usually
minority) pitchers and overestimate the talent of advantaged (usually white) pitchers. An
important contribution of my paper is to conﬁrm this general point both in the context of
gender discrimination and within a highly educated, professional working environment.21
This paper makes three ﬁnal contributions. First, it adds to extensive (ongoing) research
into peer review. Although mine, to the best of my knowledge, is the ﬁrst to suggest and
document evidence of gender bias in the peer review process (as opposed to its outcome),
it joins contemporary or parallel research studying patterns in the editorial process (Card
and DellaVigna, 2013; Clain and Leppel, 2017; Ellison, 2002) and bias in editorial deci-
sions (Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012; Bransch and Kvasnicka, 2017; Card and DellaVi-
gna, 2017).
Second, I use readability scores to untap a largely ignored, naturally occurring source
of pseudo-experiments relevant to research on gender or racial bias—and diﬀerential group
treatment, more generally.22 Readability scores have their limitations (see Section 2.1) and
their use in this manner applies to just a narrow set of questions. Nevertheless, they are
cheaper than audit and correspondence studies and arguably more objective than survey
data. An analogous approachmay (or may not) expose similar group diﬀerences in, inter alia,
successful business proposals funded by venture capitalists, letters to the editor published in
newspapers or annual report introductions by CEOs.
Third, my ﬁndings emphasise the importance of transparency and monitoring. The least
intrusive antidote to implicit bias is simple awareness and constant supervision. Unlike ref-
eree reports, journal acceptance rates are easy to measure and frequently audited; both factors
foster accountability and encourage neutrality (Foschi, 1996). Monitoring referee reports is
diﬃcult, but it isn’t impossible—especially if peer review were open. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4, several science and medical journals not only reveal referees’ identities, they also post
reports online. Quality does not decline (it may actually increase), referees still referee (even
those who initially refuse) and, given what’s at stake, an extra 25–50minutes spent reviewing
seems tolerable (van Rooyen et al., 2010; van Rooyen et al., 1999; Walsh et al., 2000).
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 describes the
data and readability measures. Analyses and results are presented in Section 3. They are
succeeded by a detailed discussion (Section 4) and conclusions (Section 5).
21Another recent study might also illustrate this point. Glover et al. (2017) ﬁnd that obvious productivity
measures decline whenminority grocery store workers are overseen by biasedmanagers. If due to demotivation
or inattention by managers—as the authors propose—their behaviour reinforces statistical discrimination. On
the other hand, slower checkout times, less overtime work and seeing fewer customers could result from biased
managers being more critical of minorities’ work (e.g., minority workers are more likely to be punished for an
incorrect amount ofmoney in the till, not immediately clocking out at the end of a shift or accidentally scanning
a single item multiple times).
22Using readability scores to uncover gender bias in the way news is reported was ﬁrst proposed by Ali et al.
(2010). In an eﬀort to determine gender diﬀerences in writing styles, Hartley et al. (2003b) compare male
and female Flesch Reading Ease scores for 80 papers published in the Journal of Educational Psychology; they
found no consistent, sex-speciﬁc diﬀerence. See Footnote 129 and Footnote 130 for a discussion and list of
other creative ways readability scores have been used in academic research.
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Table I: Article count, by journal and decade
Decade AER ECA JPE QJE Total
1950–59 120 120
1960–69 343 184 527
1970–79 660 633 1 1,294
1980–89 180 648 562 401 1,791
1990–99 476 443 478 409 1,806
2000–09 695 520 408 413 2,036
2010–15 732 384 181 251 1,548
Total 2,083 3,118 2,446 1,475 9,122
Notes. Included is every article published between January 1950 and Decem-
ber 2015 for which an English abstract was found (i) on journal websites or
websites of third party digital libraries or (ii) printed in the article itself. Papers
published in the May issue of AER (Papers & Proceedings) are excluded. Final
row and column display total article counts by journal and decade, respectively.
2 Data
The data include every English article published in AER, Econometrica, JPE and QJE be-
tween January 1950 and December 2015 (inclusive). Prior research has found authors write
in a stylistically consistent manner across the abstract, introduction and discussion section
of a peer reviewed article (Hartley et al., 2003b).23 Of these three, I concentrate on ab-
stracts. Abstract structure is standardised in a manner optimal for computing readability
scores: 100–200 words, no citations and few abbreviations and equations (Dale and Chall,
1948). Abstracts are self-contained, universally summarise the research and are the ﬁrst and
most frequently read part of an article (King et al., 2006)—all factors suggesting a relatively
homogenous degree of review across journals and subject matter. Conveniently, most have
also been converted to accurate machine-readable text by digital libraries and bibliographic
databases.
The largest sample comes from Econometrica which consistently published abstracts with
its articles prior to 1950. JPE added them in the 1960s and QJE in 1980. AER came last
in 1986.24 Table I displays data coverage by journal and decade. Bibliographic information
and PDFs were scraped from the websites of Oxford Journals, the American Economic
Association, the Econometric Society, Wiley, JSTOR and EBSCO.
Based on authors’ given names, gender was assigned via GenderChecker.com’s database
of male and female names. Authors with unisex ﬁrst names, ﬁrst names not in the database
or those identiﬁed only by initial(s) were assigned gender either by me, a research assistant
or at least three separate Mechanical Turk workers based on a visual inspection of photos on
faculty websites, Wikipedia articles, etc. or personal pronouns used in text written about the
individual. In situations where the author could not be found but several people with the
same ﬁrst and last name were and all shared the same gender, the author was also assigned
that gender. In the remaining cases, I emailed or telephoned colleagues and institutions
associated with the author.
23Within-manuscript correlations of Flesch Reading Ease scores are 0.64 (abstracts vs. introductions) to
0.74 (abstracts vs. discussions), suggesting “authors are remarkably consistent in how they use word cate-
gories” (Hartley et al., 2003a, p. 392).
24Unless otherwise mentioned, observations exclude the May issue of AER (Papers & Proceedings).
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For every article I recorded authors’ institutional aﬃliations. Individual universities in
U.S. State University Systems were coded separately (e.g., UCLA and UC Berkeley) but
think tanks and research organisations operating under the umbrella of a single university
were grouped together with that university (e.g., the Cowles Foundation and Yale Univer-
sity). Institutions linked to multiple universities are coded as separate entities (e.g., École
des hautes études en sciences sociales).
In total, 1,039 diﬀerent institutions were identiﬁed. I create 64 dummy variables, each
of which represents one or more institution(s); groupings reﬂect counts of distinct articles
in which an institution was listed as an aﬃliation.25 Speciﬁcally, institutions listed in 59
or fewer articles were grouped in bins of 10 to form six dummy variables: the 751 insti-
tutions mentioned in 0–9 articles were grouped to form the ﬁrst dummy variable, the 92
mentioned in 10–19 articles were grouped to form the second, etc. Fifty-eight institutions
were aﬃliated with 60 or more articles; each is assigned its own dummy variable. When
multiple institutions are associated with an observation, only the dummy variable with the
highest-rank is used, i.e., the highest-ranked institution per author when data is analysed at
the author-level and the highest-ranked institution for all authors when data is analysed at
the article-level.
I control for article quality and author productivity in several ways. First, I use article
citations from the Web of Science database. Second, I generate 30 dummy variables that
group authors by career-total publication counts in the four journals. For example, Daron
Acemoglu and Jean Tirole form one group (each published 45 articles as of December 2015);
Alvin Roth, Elhanan Helpman and Gene Grossman form another (27 articles).26 In Sec-
tion 3.3 and Section 3.5, I additionally control for the number of prior top-four papers (at
time of publication). For co-authored articles, only the data corresponding to the most pro-
liﬁc author is used.27
To account for English ﬂuency, most regressions include a dummy variable equal to
one if an article is co-authored by at least one native (or almost native) English speaker.
I assume an author is “native” if he: (i) was raised in an English-speaking country; (ii)
obtained all post-secondary eduction from English speaking institutions;28 or (iii) spoke
with no discernible (to me) non-native accent. This information was almost always found—
by me or a research assistant—in authors’ CVs, websites, Wikipedia articles, faculty bios
or obituaries. In the few instances where the criteria were ambiguously satisﬁed—or no
information was available—I asked friends and colleagues of the author or inferred English
ﬂuency from the author’s ﬁrst name, country of residence or surname (in that order).29
25Blank (1991) ranks institutions by National Academy of Science departmental rankings. Those and similar
oﬃcial rankings are based largely on the number of papers published in the journals analysed here.
26This quality/productivity control has several limitations: (i) it relies on publication counts—not necessarily an
accurate measure of “quality”; (ii) it discounts current junior economists’ productivity; and (iii) it generates
somewhat inconsistent groupings—for example, two authors have published 45 articles, but only one author
has published 37 (Andrei Shleifer).
27InHengel (2016, p. 42 and p. 44), I experiment with anothermeasure of quality—the order an article appeared
in an issue. It has no noticeable impact on the coeﬃcient of interest or its standard error.
28Non-native speakers who meet this criteria have been continuously exposed to spoken and written English
since age 18. This continuous exposure likely means they write as well as native English speakers. To qualify
as an English speaking institution, all courses—not just the course studied by an author—must be primar-
ily taught in English. E.g., McGill University is classiﬁed as English-speaking; University of Bonn is not
(although most of its graduate economics instruction is in English).
29I also conducted a primitive surname analysis (see Hengel, 2016, pp. 35–36). It suggests that the female
authors in my data are no more or less likely to be native English speakers.
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I create dummy variables corresponding to the 20 primary JEL categories to control for
subject matter. The JEL system was signiﬁcantly revised in 1990; because exact mapping
from one system to another is not possible, I collected these data only for articles published
post-reform—about 60 percent of the dataset. Codes were recorded whenever found in the
text of an article or on the websites where bibliographic information was scraped. Remain-
ing articles were classiﬁed using codes from the American Economic Association’s Econlit
database.
To control for editorial policy, I recorded editor/editorial board member names from
issue mastheads. AER and Econometrica employ an individual to oversee policy. JPE and
QJE do not generally name one lead editor and instead rely on boards composed of four
to ﬁve faculty members at the University of Chicago and Harvard, respectively.30 Editor
controls are based on distinct lead editor/editorial boards—i.e., they diﬀer by at least one
member. In total, 74 groups are formed in this manner.
The analysis in Section 3.3 matches published articles with NBER working papers.
Matches were ﬁrst attempted using citation data fromRePEc and then by searchingNBER’s
database directly for unmatched papers authored by NBER family members. 1,986 pub-
lished articles were eventually matched to 1,988 NBER working papers—approximately
one-ﬁfth of the data.31 Bibliographic information and abstract text were scraped from
www.nber.org.
The analysis in Section 3.5 compiles submit-accept times atEconometrica—the only jour-
nal that makes any kind of disaggregated data on the revision process publicly available.32
I extracted this information from digitised articles using the open source command utility
pdftotext.
To control for motherhood’s impact on revision times, I recorded children’s birth years
for women with at least one 100 percent female-authored paper in Econometrica. I person-
ally (and, I apologise, rather unsettlingly) gleaned this information from published proﬁles,
CVs, acknowledgements,Wikipedia, personal websites, Facebook pages, intelius.com back-
ground checks and local school district/popular extra-curricular activity websites.33 Exact
years were recorded whenever found; otherwise, they were approximated by subtracting a
child’s actual or estimated age from the date the source material was posted online. If an
exhaustive search turned up no reference to children, I assumed the woman in question did
not have any.34
30In recent years, JPE has been published under the aegis of a lead editor.
31Because a small number of NBER working papers were eventually published as multiple articles or combined
into a single paper, the mapping is not one-for-one.
32Printed at the end of every Econometrica article published on or after March 1970 that was not originally
presented as an Econometric Society lecture is the date it was ﬁrst submitted and the date ﬁnal revisions
were received. Before 1970, only “A Capital Intensive Approach to the Small Sample Properties of Various
Simultaneous Equation Estimators” ( January, 1965) included this information. “Separable Preferences, Strat-
egyproofness, and Decomposability” (May, 1999) only printed the year of submission; I assume the month is
January.
33While the information I found was publicly available, I apologise for the obvious intrusion.
34In several instances, I obtained this information from acquaintances, friends and colleagues or by asking the
woman directly. Given its sensitive nature, children’s birth years are not currently available on my website
(unlike other data in this paper).
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Table II: Readability scores
Score Formula
Flesch Reading Ease 206.835− 1.015×AWS − 84.6×ASW
Flesch-Kincaid −15.59 + 0.390×AWS + 11.8×ASW
Gunning Fog 0.4× (AWS + 100× PWW )
SMOG 3.1291 + 5.7127×√APS
Dale-Chall 3.6365 + 0.0496×AWS + 15.79×DWW
Notes. AWS: average number of words per sentence; ASW : average number of syllables per word; PWW : ratio of
polysyllabic words (3+ syllables) to word count;APS: average number of polysyllabic words per sentence;DWW : ratio
of diﬃcult words (not on Dale-Chall list) to word count.
2.1 Measuring readability
Advanced vocabulary and complicated sentences are the two strongest predictors of read-
ability (Chall and Dale, 1995; DuBay, 2004). Most readability formulas exploit this rela-
tionship, combining frequency of easy words with sentence length to arrive at a single score.
Although hundreds exist, I concentrate on the ﬁve most widely used, tested and reliable
measures for adult reading material: Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog,
SMOG (SimpleMeasure of Gobbledegook) andDale-Chall (DuBay, 2004). Each are listed
in Table II.
The Flesch Reading Ease scales from 0 (hard) to 100 (easy). In contrast, the other
four scores generate grade levels estimating the minimum years of schooling necessary to
conﬁdently understand an evaluated text—and so lower scores indicate easier-to-read text.
To minimise confusion, I multiply the four grade-level scores by negative one. Thus, higher
numbers universally correspond to clearer writing throughout the paper.
The constants in each formula vary widely as do the components used to rank vocabulary.
The Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid scales rely on syllable count, Gunning Fog and
SMOG total polysyllabic words (words with three or more syllables) while Dale-Chall tallies
words not on a pre-deﬁned list of 3,000 so-called “easy” words.35 These diﬀerences mean the
four grade-level scores rarely generate identical ﬁgures; nevertheless, all ﬁve scores produce
roughly equivalent rankings (Begeny and Greene, 2014).
Criticisms of readability scores are usually levied at their imprecision.36 Evidence sug-
gests they may not be accurate enough to adequately assess or guide development of legal
briefs (Sirico, 2007), ﬁnancial disclosure documents (Loughran and McDonald, 2014) or
school reading material (Ardoin et al., 2005; Powell-Smith and Bradley-Klug, 2001). But
despite poor accuracy, readability scores do correlate with reading diﬃculty (Begeny and
Greene, 2014; DuBay, 2004; Francis et al., 2008; Hintze and Christ, 2004) making them
appropriate measures to estimate gender diﬀerences in large samples.37
35Speciﬁcally, 3,000 words understood by 80 percent of fourth-grade readers (aged 9–10).
36Another criticism of readability formulas is that their use encourages writers to shorten sentences and chose
simpler vocabulary at the expense of comprehension (for a discussion, seeDuBay, 2004; Long andChristensen,
2011). This study implicitly assumes that the authors of papers published in the four journals and time periods
covered by the data have not “written to the formula” in any meaningful (or gender-speciﬁc) way.
37At a bare minimum, no study (to my knowledge) has ever shown that any of the ﬁve scores used here are
signiﬁcantly inversely related to reading diﬃculty. Evidence from Begeny and Greene (2014) suggests the
four grade-level readability scores, and particularly the SMOG and Dale-Chall scores, are more accurate for
higher ability readers. (The study did not assess the Flesch Reading Ease score.)
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A second criticism of readability scores is practical. Some programs that calculate them
rely on unclear, inconsistent and possibly inaccurate algorithms to count words, sentences
and syllables and determine whether a word is on Dale-Chall’s easy word list (for a discus-
sion, see Sirico, 2007). Additionally, features of the text—particularly full stops used in
abbreviations and decimals in numbers—frequently underestimate average words per sen-
tence and syllables per word.38
To transparently handle these issues and eliminate ambiguity in how the readability
scores were calculated, I wrote the Python module Textatistic. Its code and detailed doc-
umentation is available at GitHub. A brief description is provided here.
To determine sentence count, the program replaces common abbreviations with their full
text,39 decimals with a zero and deletes question and exclamation marks used in an obvi-
ous, mid-sentence rhetorical manner.40 The remaining full stops, exclamation and question
marks are assumed to end a sentence and counted.
Next, hyphens are deleted from commonly hyphenated single words such as “co-author”
and the rest are replaced with spaces, remaining punctuation is removed and words are split
into an array based on whitespace. Word count is the length of that array.41
An attempt is made to match each word to one on an expanded Dale-Chall list. The
count of diﬃcult words is the number that are not found. This expanded list, available on
GitHub, consists of 8,490 words. It is based on the original 3,000 words, but also includes
verb tenses, comparative and superlative adjective forms, plural nouns, etc. It was created
by ﬁrst adding to the Dale-Chall list every conceivable alternate form of each word using
Python’s Pattern library. To eliminate nonsense words, the text of 94 English novels pub-
lished online with Project Gutenberg were matched with words on the expanded list. Words
not found in any of the novels were deleted.
Syllable counts are based on the C library libhyphen, an implementation of the hyphen-
ation algorithm from Liang (1983). Liang (1983)’s algorithm is used by TEX’s typesetting
system. libhyphen is employed by most open source text processing software, including
OpenOﬃce.
3 Analyses and results
Analyses and results are organised as follows. In Section 3.1, I scrutinise readability at the
article level, controlling for editor, journal, year, journal and year interactions, institution,
author productivity, article quality (citation count), English ﬂuency and ﬁeld. The results
suggest a gap does indeed exist. They also rule out obvious confounding factors—women
writing on easier topics, editorial policies in earlier eras, etc. Next (Section 3.2), I investigate
readability at the author-level in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression. This accounts for author-speciﬁc
productivity, quality and other eﬀects that inﬂuence writing—e.g., innate talent—but are
otherwise unconnected to peer review.
38Typesetting code used to render equations—common in Econometrica abstracts published before 1980—also
aﬀects the accuracy of readability scores. I therefore manually replaced all such code with equivalent unicode
characters. When no exact replacement existed, characters were chosen that mimicked as much as possible
the equation’s original intent while maintaining the same character and word counts. Readability scores were
determined using the modiﬁed text.
39Abbreviations which do not include full-stops are not altered. I manually replaced common abbreviations,
such as “i.e.” and “U.S.” with their abbreviated versions, sans full stops.
40For example, “?).” is replaced with “).”.
41Per Chall and Dale (1995), hyphenated words count as two (or more) words.
12
Table III: Textual characteristics per sentence, by gender
Men Women Diﬀerence
No. characters 134.73 130.27 4.46***
(0.43) (1.45) (1.57)
No. words 24.16 23.06 1.10***
(0.08) (0.27) (0.29)
No. syllables 40.65 38.65 2.01***
(0.13) (0.45) (0.48)
No. polysyllabic words 4.69 4.31 0.39***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.08)
No. diﬃcult words 9.38 8.91 0.48***
(0.03) (0.12) (0.13)
Notes. Sample 9,122. Figures from an OLS regression of female ratio on each characteristic
divided by sentence count. Male eﬀects estimated at a ratio of zero; female eﬀects estimated
at a ratio of one. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * diﬀerence statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
In Section 3.3, I match published articles—which have gone through peer review—to
earlier, draft versions of the same papers—which have not. Assuming timing independence,
this isolates the eﬀect of peer review and causally links it to the gender readability gap. Sec-
tion 3.4 takes the ﬁnal step and causally links the gap to referees and/or editors. I ﬁrst
develop a dynamic model of an author’s decision-making process to evaluate the remain-
ing alternatives (Section 3.4.1): gender diﬀerences in biology/behaviour and/or knowledge
about referee expectations. Based on the model, I propose a method for identifying the im-
pact of discrimination on authors’ readability. In Section 3.4.3, I use matching to estimate
it.
Finally, prolonged peer review should be one observable repercussion from subjecting
female authors to higher standards. Using submit-accept times from Econometrica, I eval-
uate this hypothesis, controlling for, inter alia, motherhood, childbirth, citations and ﬁeld
(Section 3.5).
3.1 Article-level analysis
Table III displays each gender’s average per sentence number of characters, words, syllables,
polysyllabic words and diﬃcult words. Women write shorter, simpler sentences—they con-
tain fewer characters, fewer syllables, fewer words and fewer “hard” words. Diﬀerences are
highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Table IV presents coeﬃcients from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the
ratio of female co-authors on the ﬁve readability scores. To account for error correlation
by editorial policy, observations are grouped by journal editor/editorial board and standard
errors are adjusted accordingly.42
Column (1) controls for journal and editor: abstracts written only by women score about
one point higher on the Flesch Reading Ease scale; according to the four grade-level mea-
sures, they take 1–6 fewer months of schooling to understand.43 Percentage-wise, women
42Standard errors are very similar when clustering at the volume-, issue- or paper-level (see Hengel, 2016, p.
39–41).
43Coeﬃcients from regressions on Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and Dale-Chall scores represent the
marginal eﬀect in years of schooling. Monthly ﬁgures found by multiplying each coeﬃcient by 12.
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Table IV: Gender diﬀerences in readability, article-level analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flesch Reading Ease 0.90* 0.87* 0.83* 0.81 0.97* 0.52 0.92
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.53) (0.71)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.19* 0.18 0.18 0.19* 0.22* 0.23* 0.25*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Gunning Fog 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.34** 0.36**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
SMOG 0.21** 0.21** 0.22** 0.21** 0.23** 0.19* 0.23*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Dale-Chall 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09** 0.11** 0.09* 0.13**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3¹ 3¹ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3
JEL (primary) eﬀects 3
JEL (tertiary) eﬀects 3
Notes. 9,122 articles in (1)–(5); 5,216 articles in (6); 5,777 articles—including 561 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 46)—in
(7). Figures represent the coeﬃcient on female ratio from an OLS regression on the relevant readability score. Quality controls denoted
by 31 include citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered on editor in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
write 1–2 percent better than men.44
Column (2) includes 63 year dummies; column (3) adds another 182 journal and year
interaction dummies; columns (4) and (5) introduce 64 institution eﬀects, quality controls—
citation count and 30 max. Tj eﬀects (maximum co-author lifetime publication count for
paper j)—and a dummy variable capturing English ﬂuency.45 Coeﬃcients and standard
errors in columns (2)–(5) are very similar to those in column (1).
The coeﬃcients on the journal dummies in (2) are presented in Appendix D.1. They
compare AER’s readability to the readability of Econometrica, JPE and QJE, providing a
useful check on the reliability of readability formulas in the context of economic writing. As
intuitively expected, all ﬁve scores agree that Econometrica is harder to read; four out of ﬁve
scores suggest JPE is, too, while QJE is easier.
Columns (6) and (7) control for primary JEL classiﬁcation. (6) includes 20 ﬁxed eﬀects
for primary JEL categories; (7) includes 718 eﬀects for tertiary categories. Due to small
sample sizes, (7) includes 561 articles from AER Papers & Proceedings.46 Since only post–
44Quotient of the coeﬃcient on female ratio divided by the eﬀect for men (ratio of zero) estimated at other
co-variates’ observed values (see Appendix D.1).
45In Hengel (2016, p. 44 and p. 46), I include controls for the order an article appears in an issue—another
measure of a paper’s quality. Results are similar to those in Table IV. In addition to the control from English
ﬂuency presented here, see Hengel (2016, pp. 35–36) for further evicence that the female authors in my data
are no more or less likely to be native English speakers.
46AER Papers & Proceedings is coded as a separate journal and edited by the American Economic Association’s
president-elect. AER Papers & Proceedings does not publish abstracts in its print version; only select years and
papers are available online (2003 and 2011–2015), all of which are included. Excluding these articles does not
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Figure I: Gender diﬀerences in readability, by JEL classiﬁcation
Notes. Sample 5,777 articles, including 561 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 46). Codes A, B, M and P dropped due
to small sample sizes of female-authored papers (see Footnote 47). Estimates from an OLS regression of:
Rj = β0 + β1female ratioj + β2 Jj + β3 female ratioj × Jj + θXj + εj ,
where Rj is the readability score for article j; female ratioj is paper j ’s ratio of female authors to total authors; Jj is a 15 × 1
column vector with kth entry a binary variable equal to one if article j is classiﬁed as the kth JEL code; Xj is a vector of editor,
journal, year, institution, English language dummies and quality controls (citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects); εj is the error
term. Left-hand graph shows marginal eﬀects of female ratio for each JEL code (β1+β
k
3 ); the pink vertical line is the mean eﬀect
at observed JEL codes (0.128, standard error 0.046). Right-hand graph displays interaction terms (βk3 ). Horizontal lines represent
90 percent conﬁdence intervals from standard errors adjusted for clustering on editor.
1990 JEL classiﬁcations are used, estimates in both columns exclude over 40 percent of the
data. Nevertheless, coeﬃcients and standard errors are roughly equivalent.
Figure I displays results from an ordinary least squares regression on the Dale-Chall
score; regressors are: (i) ratio of female co-authors; (ii) dummies for each primary JEL code;
(iii) interactions from (i) and (ii); (iv) controls for editor, journal, year, institution and En-
glish ﬂuency; and (v) quality controls—citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects.47 Again,
due to small samples—particularly of female authors—Figure I includes 561 articles from
AER Papers & Proceedings.48
Thepink vertical line in Figure I’s left-hand graph is themarginal eﬀect of female author-
ship at the mean. Its estimate coincides with results in Table IV—women’s papers require six
fewer weeks of schooling to understand—and is highly signiﬁcant. Points reﬂect marginal
eﬀects across JEL classiﬁcation; bars represent 90 percent conﬁdence intervals from standard
errors clustered by editor.
Women earn higher marks for clarity in 11 out of 15 categories; only three are at least
impact results or conclusions—coeﬃcients are almost identical to those in column (6), but standard errors are
somewhat higher. (Analysis not shown, but is available on request: erin.hengel@gmail.com.)
47Codes A, B, M and P are dropped due to insuﬃcient number of female-authored papers: each had fewer than
10 papers authored only by women. No paper is classiﬁed under category Y.
48See Hengel (2016, pp. 42–43) for a version of Figure I excluding AER Papers & Proceedings articles.
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weakly signiﬁcant: Q (Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and
Ecological Economics), N (Economic History), and J (Labour Economics). Men may be
better writers in C (Mathematical and Quantitative Methods), L (Industrial Organisation),
O (Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth) andH (Pub-
lic Economics); none, however, are statistically diﬀerent from zero. Figure I’s right-hand
graph displays coeﬃcients from interacting the ratio of female co-authors with each JEL
code. Q and N are signiﬁcantly above the mean, O and H signiﬁcantly below it. Remain-
ing categories are not statistically diﬀerent from the mean eﬀect.
In general, sample sizes are small and estimates imprecise—only Labour Economics and
Microeconomics contain more than 100 papers written only by women (the others average
35). Nevertheless, Figure I suggests two things. First, the mostly insigniﬁcant interaction
terms indicate outlier ﬁelds are probably not driving journals’ gender readability gap—nor
is any speciﬁc ﬁeld bucking the trend. Second, the number of women in a ﬁeld appears
to have little eﬀect on the size of the gap: Agriculture/Environment has one of the lowest
concentrations of female-authored papers—but Economic History has one of the highest
(Labour Economics falls between the two). Of course, Economic History papers are still
overwhelmingly—as in 74 percent—penned just by men. But given the readability gap is
present in subﬁelds with both above- and below-average rates of sole female authorship,
women may need to be better writers even where more of them publish.
In the remainder of the paper, I do not explicitly control for JEL classiﬁcation (unless
otherwise speciﬁed). Comparable codes are available for only a subset of the data and Ta-
ble IV and Figure I suggest they are relatively unimportant, anyway.
3.2 Author-level analysis
I next analyse readability at the author-level. To disaggregate the data, each article is dupli-
catedNj times, whereNj is article j ’s number of co-authors; observation jk ∈ {1, . . . , Nj}
is assigned article j ’s kth author. I then estimate the dynamic panel model in Equation (1):
Rjit = β0Rit−1 + β1 female ratioj + β2 female ratioj ×malei + θXj + αi + εit. (1)
Rjit is the readability score for article j—author i’s tth publication;Rit−1 is the correspond-
ing value of author i’s t − 1th paper. Gender enters twice—the binary variable malei and
female ratioj—to account for author i’s sex and the sex of his co-authors, respectively. Xj is
a vector of observable controls. It includes: editor, journal, year, journal × year, institution
and English ﬂuency dummies; quality controls—citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects;
andNj to account for author i’s proportional contribution to paper j. αi are author-speciﬁc
eﬀects and εit is an idiosyncratic error. αi are eliminated by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing; endogeneity
in the lagged dependant variable is instrumented with earlier lags (Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998). To account for duplicate articles, the regression is weighted by
1/Nj .49 Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering on editor and author.
Table V displays results. Rows one and two present contemporaneous marginal eﬀects
on co-authoring with women for female (β1) and male (β1 + β2) authors, respectively.
Both estimates are positive—everyone writes more clearly when collaborating with women.
Marginal eﬀects for women are highly signiﬁcant and at least twice as large as those in
49Assigning equal weight to all observations results in quantitatively and qualitatively similar results (see Hengel,
2016, pp. 44–45).
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Table V: Gender diﬀerences in readability, author-level analysis
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
Female ratio (women) 2.37** 0.35* 0.66*** 0.48** 0.23**
(1.00) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.10)
Female ratio (men) 0.57 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.10
(1.31) (0.25) (0.30) (0.21) (0.11)
Female ratio×male −1.80 −0.26 −0.50 −0.38 −0.14
(1.53) (0.32) (0.37) (0.27) (0.13)
Lagged score 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.03**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
z-test for no serial correlation
Order 1 −20.26 −15.97 −17.14 −19.93 −20.75
Order 2 0.56 −0.22 0.08 0.19 −0.73
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3¹ 3¹ 3¹ 3¹ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,186 observations (2,827 authors). Figures from ﬁrst-diﬀerenced, IV estimation of Equation (1) (Arellano
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Female ratio (women): contemporaneous marginal eﬀect of a paper’s female
co-author ratio for female authors (β1); female ratio (men): analogous eﬀect for male authors (β1 + β2). z-statistics
for ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced errors (Arellano and Bond, 1991); null hypothesis no
autocorrelation. Quality controls denoted by 31 include citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects. Regressions weighted
by 1/Nj ; standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering on editor and author (in parentheses). ***, ** and * statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table IV—women write 2–6 percent better than men.50 When men write with women,
however, marginal eﬀects are smaller and less precise.
Men and women co-authoring together experience an identical rise (or fall) in readabil-
ity, so the eﬀect for one should mirror the other. Yet, Table V suggests they don’t. While
the interaction terms (β2) are insigniﬁcant—i.e., the observed disparity is plausibly due to
chance—the diﬀerence may reveal an increasing, convex relationship between female ratio
and readability. Men’s smaller eﬀect potentially reﬂects their disproportionate tendency to
co-author exclusively with other men—precisely where the marginal impact of an additional
woman is low.51
Tests for serial correlation indicate nomodel misspeciﬁcation. Coeﬃcients on the lagged
dependant variables are small, suggesting readability is mostly determined contemporane-
ously, possibly during the revision process. Nevertheless, their uniform positivity and sig-
niﬁcance indicate modest persistence.
50Quotient of β1 divided by the total eﬀect for men co-authoring with no women (female ratio of zero) estimated
at other co-variates’ observed values (see Appendix D.2).
51On average, the female ratio for men is 0.04 (0.05 excluding solo-authored papers). When excluding articles
written entirely by men, their average ratio is still only 0.39. By default, women always author with at least one
woman—themselves; the average female ratio of their papers is 0.6 (0.46 and 0.53 excluding articles written
entirely by women and solo-authored papers, respectively).
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3.3 Comparing abstracts pre- and post-review.
Table IV establishes a gender readability gap for abstracts published in top economics jour-
nals. Table V suggests it primarily forms contemporaneously. A possible contemporaneous
cause is peer review—speciﬁcally referee and/or editor demands for more revisions by female
authors.
In this section, I show that peer review does indeed cause (or exacerbate) the gender
readability gap. To do so, I analyse papers before and after review by comparing published
articles to their draft versions. Assuming peer review is the sole gender-related factor to
aﬀect abstract readability between versions, a larger increase in women’s readability relative
to men’s is evidence of causality.
3.3.1 Summary statistics. As discussed in Section 2, drafts were collected from NBER
Technical andWorking Paper Series. NBER series were used as the exclusive data source for
two reasons. First, approximately one-ﬁfth of articles in the data were originally part of an
NBER series, making it the largest single source of draft papers. Second, NBER persistently
releases its working papers two to three years before publication (mean 2.1 years)—precisely
the length of time spent in peer review (Ellison, 2002; Goldberg, 2015).
Table VI compares textual characteristics between versions. Means in the ﬁrst three
columns are of majority male-authored papers (female ratio strictly below 50 percent); the
ﬁnal three columns are majority female-authored papers (female ratio at or above 50 per-
cent).
Abstracts are considerably altered during peer review. Table VI’s ﬁrst panel displays raw
counts. Draft abstracts are longer—more characters, words and sentences—and denser—
more syllables, polysyllabic words and diﬃcult words. The biggest changes are made to
female-authored papers: ﬁgures in column six are 20–30 percent higher (in absolute value)
than those in column three.
Peer review’s impact on readability, however, is unclear. Readability scores are weighted
averages of the ratios of (i) total word or “hard” word to sentence count and (ii) hard word to
word count. Between working paper and published versions, (i) decreases and (ii) increases
(Table VI, second panel).52 (i) Peer review shortens sentences and reduces hard words per
sentence: in male-authored papers, sentences are 5 percent shorter and contain 26 percent
fewer polysyllabic words; in female-authored papers, they are 7 percent shorter and contain
30 percent fewer polysyllabic words. (ii) As a fraction of total word count, however, syllables,
polysyllabic words and diﬃcult words rise. To wit, hard word counts and total word count
decline, but the latter by proportionately more; their ratios increase: between 1–3 percent
for men and 1–2 percent for women.
According to the majority of scores, peer review improves readability (Table VI, third
panel), a ﬁnding consistent with similar investigations at medical journals (Biddle and Aker,
1996; Hayden, 2008; Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994).53 Thanks to fewer hard words
52A greater decline in total word count relative to hard word count may be speciﬁc to abstracts, which are edited
for length as well as readability. In an analysis of abstracts, introductions and discussions, abstract sentences
were shorter but contained more hard words; overall, they had the lowest Flesch Reading Ease scores (Hartley
et al., 2003a).
53Hayden (2008) found no signiﬁcant change in the Flesch Reading Ease score during peer review itself (sub-
mission vs. acceptance), but a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect from post-acceptance editing by the journal editor and
a copy-editor. Compared to economics journals, however, medical journals ask for fewer revisions (Ellison,
2002; Hayden, 2008) and enjoy substantially shorter review times (see, e.g., Journal of Trauma and Acute Care
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Table VI: Textual characteristics, published papers vs. drafts
Men Women
Working
paper
Published
article Diﬀerence
Working
paper
Published
article Diﬀerence
No. sentences 6.47 5.10 −1.375*** 6.77 5.06 −1.711***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.054) (0.15) (0.08) (0.139)
No. characters 862.45 649.68 −212.767*** 907.36 635.97 −271.385***
(7.19) (4.67) (7.160) (18.53) (10.31) (18.439)
No. words 155.70 115.70 −40.004*** 164.45 113.63 −50.813***
(1.32) (0.85) (1.323) (3.42) (1.91) (3.428)
No. syllables 257.01 193.36 −63.653*** 269.02 187.78 −81.242***
(2.15) (1.40) (2.135) (5.54) (3.08) (5.504)
No. polysyllabic words 28.36 21.81 −6.545*** 28.93 20.63 −8.308***
(0.28) (0.18) (0.245) (0.71) (0.41) (0.627)
No. diﬃcult words 58.51 44.61 −13.892*** 60.32 42.37 −17.949***
(0.51) (0.33) (0.482) (1.30) (0.74) (1.204)
No. words / sentence count 24.74 23.58 −1.166*** 24.98 23.16 −1.820***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.124) (0.33) (0.27) (0.302)
No. polysyllabic words /
sentence count
6.03 4.45 −1.576*** 6.05 4.23 −1.819***
(0.07) (0.03) (0.060) (0.18) (0.08) (0.155)
No. syllables / word count 1.66 1.68 0.018*** 1.64 1.66 0.015***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.01) (0.00) (0.004)
No. polysyllabic words / word
count
0.18 0.19 0.006*** 0.18 0.18 0.005**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002)
No. diﬃcult words / word
count
0.38 0.39 0.009*** 0.37 0.37 0.006**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002)
Flesch Reading Ease 41.46 41.13 −0.332* 42.51 43.08 0.564
(0.26) (0.18) (0.185) (0.66) (0.43) (0.452)
Flesch-Kincaid −13.62 −13.38 0.243*** −13.53 −13.00 0.531***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.050) (0.15) (0.11) (0.122)
Gunning Fog −17.28 −17.04 0.242*** −17.13 −16.58 0.547***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.055) (0.18) (0.13) (0.140)
SMOG −15.14 −15.00 0.135*** −15.02 −14.70 0.327***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.035) (0.13) (0.09) (0.095)
Dale-Chall −10.85 −10.93 −0.084*** −10.71 −10.70 0.003
(0.02) (0.02) (0.016) (0.06) (0.04) (0.037)
Notes. Sample 1,714 published articles authored by more than 50 percent men (1,715 NBER working papers); 364 published articles
authored by at least 50 percent women (365 NBER working papers). Figures are means of textual characteristics by sex for NBER working
papers and published articles. Third and sixth columns subtract working paper ﬁgures (columns 1 and 4) from published article ﬁgures
(columns 2 and 5) for men and women. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * diﬀerence statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Figure II: Published paper vs. draft readability
Notes. Sample 1,631 NBER working papers; 1,629 published articles. Data points represent each abstract’s −1 × Dale-Chall
score pre-publicaction (NBER working paper) plotted against its−1×Dale-Chall post-publication score. Pink represents women
co-authoring only with other women (65 NBER working papers; 64 published articles); blue are men co-authoring only with other
men (1,566 NBER working papers; 1,565 published articles); articles co-authored by men and women are omitted. The line of best
ﬁt using OLS is shown separately for men and women. The grey dashed line is the 45 degree line through the origin; points above
(below) it denote abstracts that were better written after (before) peer review.
per sentence, SMOG scores are higher in published articles regardless of gender (see Ta-
ble II). In female-authored papers, the net eﬀect for remaining scores is similarly positive.
In male-authored papers, however, only the Gunning Fog and Flesch-Kincaid scores indi-
cate a positive net eﬀect; for the Flesch Reading Ease and Dale-Chall scores, it’s negative.
In any case, women’s papers endure comparatively greater cuts in hard words relative to total
words and larger falls in words per sentence; their abstracts always become more readable
during peer review than do those by men.
Figure II reiterates women’s readability gains. It plots draft Dale-Chall scores (x-axis)
against abstracts’ published scores (y axis) for men (blue) and women (pink). The grey,
dashed line is a 45 degree line through the origin. As might be expected, poorly written
draft abstracts emerge more readable in the published version (above the 45 degree line);
abstracts that were already well written come out slightly less so (below the 45 degree line).
Regardless, female-authored published papers are again more readable than they were as
working papers relative to male-authored papers—further evidence that women’s papers are
more heavily scrutinised during peer review.54
3.3.2 Identiﬁcation. The data pre- and post-review make it possible to isolate gender dif-
ferences in readability pre-existing peer review from those incurred during it—and therefore
identify gender’s contemporaneous eﬀect on peer review scrutiny. The key equation connects
published articles to earlier versions of the same paper: scores depend on draft readability
Editorial Board, 2015), suggesting pre-acceptance readability edits are less common.
54An alternative hypothesis consistent with Figure II is that male-authored papers are scrutinised more, but edits
made as a result reduce readability. Themore substantial changes made to female-authored papers documented
in Table VI, however, contradicts this theory.
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as well as factors that aﬀect writing clarity any time after being released as working papers.
Equation (2) is the OLS representation of this relationship.
RjP = RjW + β0P + β1P female ratioj + θP XjP + µjP + εjP , (2)
where RjP and RjW are readability scores for working (W ) and published (P ) versions of
paper j, respectively. β0P is a constant speciﬁc to version P ; β1P is the coeﬃcient of interest
and reﬂects the particular impact female ratioj has in peer review. XjP and µjP are P -
speciﬁc observable (editor, journal, journal-year interactions and English language dummies
and max. tj) and unobservable components, respectively.55 εjP is P ’s error term.
P -speciﬁc variables may be correlated with RjW . Even if µjP and female ratioj remain
independent, positive correlation betweenRjW and female ratioj (Table VI) still biasesOLS
estimates of β1P in a direction opposite to the bias on RjW . Equation (3) eliminates the
distortion by subtracting RjW from both sides of Equation (2):
RjP −RjW = β0P + β1P female ratioj + θP XjP + µjP + εjP . (3)
Assuming zero partial correlation between female ratioj and µjP , OLS generates an unbi-
ased estimate of β1P .
An alternative strategy based on Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) separately estimates
NBERworking paper and published article readability using generalised least squares (GLS);
β1P is identiﬁed post-estimation by diﬀerencing coeﬃcients. The set-up combines Equa-
tion (2) with a relationship deﬁning readability scores before external evaluators demand edits
(Equation (4)).
RjW = β0W + β1W female ratioj + θW XjW + µjW + εjW , (4)
where β0W is a constant speciﬁc to version W and β1W reﬂects female ratioj ’s impact on
readability prior to peer review. XjW and µjW are version-invariant observable (publica-
tion year, citation count and max. Tj) and unobservable components, respectively.56 εjW is
versionW ’s error term.
OLS estimates of Equation (4) may be biased by arbitrary correlation between µjW
and the explanatory variables. Equation (5) deﬁnes a general structure for that correla-
tion (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994).
µjW = γ + η female ratioj + δW XjW + δP XjP + ωj , (5)
where ωj is uncorrelated with female ratioj , XjW and XjP . Substituting Equation (5) into
Equation (4) generates the following reduced form representation of RjW :
RjW = β˜0W + β˜1W female ratioj + θ˜W XjW + δP XjP + ε˜jW , (6)
55max. tj is the number of prior papers published in any of the top four economics journals by article j ‘s most
proliﬁc co-author. It and the English language dummy are considered P -speciﬁc because they may inﬂuence
the degree to which editors and/or referees scrutinise the paper. Because all papers in both samples share the
same highest-ranked institution (NBER), authors’ institutions—which presumably have a similar eﬀect—are
omitted.
56I assume the duration between a paper’s NBER release and its publication is too short to inﬂuence aggregate
time trends; publication year dummies are applied to both working paper and published versions.
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where β˜0W = β0W +γ, β˜1W = β1W +η, θ˜W = θW +δW and ε˜jW = εjW +ωj . Similarly,
obtain RjP ’s reduced form by substituting Equation (6) into Equation (2):
RjP =(β˜0W + β0P ) + (β˜1W + β1P ) female ratioj
+ θ˜W XjW + θ˜P XjP + µjP + ε˜jP ,
(7)
where θ˜P = θP + δP and ε˜jP = ε˜jW + εjP . Equation (6) and Equation (7) are explic-
itly estimated via feasible GLS (FGLS). β1P is identiﬁable post-estimation by subtracting
reduced form coeﬃcients; assuming zero partial correlation between µjP and female ratioj ,
it is unbiased.57
Both OLS estimation of Equation (3) and FGLS estimation of Equation (6) and Equa-
tion (7) require zero partial correlation between µjP and female ratioj to obtain a valid
β1P .58 Roughly restated, non-peer review factors must be either independent of its tim-
ing (and therefore subsumed in version-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects) or unrelated to gender.59
Section 3.3.3 evaluates this assumption; brieﬂy, however, I could think of nothing that si-
multaneously (and convincingly) inﬂuences readability, coincides with peer review’s timing
and correlates with author gender.60
3.3.3 Results. Table VII presents results from OLS estimation of Equation (2), FGLS
estimation of Equation (6) and Equation (7) and OLS estimation of Equation (3). Since
gender bias is possible only when authors’ identities are known or can be reasonably guessed,
estimates exclude the 279 articles subjected to double-blind review at the AER and QJE
before the internet.61
Results in Table VII strongly indicate the readability gap grew precisely while papers
were being reviewed. The ﬁrst column displays β1P from OLS estimation of Equation (2).
According to all ﬁve scores, women’s readability gains outpace men’s between versions. Es-
timates additionally conﬁrm published readability is correlated with draft readability: coef-
ﬁcients on RjW (shown in Appendix D.3) are positive and signiﬁcant—but only about 0.8.
57µjP may be correlated with ε˜jW via ωj and/or εjW without biasing the FGLS estimate of β1P because
both are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in Equation (4) (by assumption) and Equation (6) (by
deﬁnition).
58Unbiased estimation of β1P in Equation (7) requires zero partial correlation between µjP and female ratioj
after controlling for XjW and XjP ; Equation (3) requires zero partial correlation after controlling for XjP ,
only.
59This phrasing is slightly inaccurate but convenient for exposition. Zero correlation between female ratioj and
µjP does not preclude biased estimates of β1P when µjP is correlated with other explanatory variables that
are, in turn, correlated with female ratioj by some factor independent of µjP . Unbiasedness instead requires
zero partial correlation between µjP and female ratioj .
60A possible exception is external feedback solicited outside of peer review—e.g., during conferences and sem-
inars. As the next section points out, however, the population of people who provide such feedback overlaps
with the population of journal referees. It seems unlikely that this population is biased only in one setting—
especially given both settings emphasise gender neutrality.
61Excluding these observations does not noticeably impact results or conclusions (for estimates based on the
full sample, see Hengel, 2016, p. 18). Two journals—QJE and AER—employed double-blind review at some
point during the time period covered by the data. QJE used double-blind procedures until 1 June, 2005. AER‘s
spell began 1 July, 1989 and ended 1 July, 2011. Because a ﬁnal publication date may substantially lag the actual
review date (for an illustration and discussion, see Blank, 1991), I exclude only AER articles published after
1992. Economics working papers are generally posted online—and NBERworking papers necessarily are—so
I assume double-blind review was no longer eﬀective at hiding authors’ identities after the internet. Thus, all
articles published post-Google’s year of incorporation (1998) are included in the sample.
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Table VII: The impact of gender, speciﬁc to peer review
OLS FGLS OLS
Published
article
Working
paper
Published
article Diﬀerence
Change
in score
Flesch Reading Ease 1.33** 2.26** 3.21*** 0.95* 0.94
(0.58) (1.01) (1.22) (0.57) (0.60)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.52*** 0.31 0.76*** 0.44** 0.44**
(0.18) (0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19)
Gunning Fog 0.52*** 0.44* 0.86*** 0.42** 0.42**
(0.19) (0.24) (0.29) (0.19) (0.20)
SMOG 0.30** 0.33** 0.56*** 0.24** 0.24*
(0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12)
Dale-Chall 0.18*** 0.32*** 0.45*** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 34
Native speaker 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,801 NBER working papers; 1,799 published articles. Estimates exclude 279 pre-internet double-blind
reviewed articles (see Footnote 61). Column one displays coeﬃcients on female ratio (β1P ) from estimating Equation (2)
directly via OLS (see Appendix D.3 for coeﬃcients onRjW ); standard errors clustered by editor in parentheses. Columns
two and three display β˜1W and β˜1W + β1P from FGLS estimation of Equation (6) and Equation (7), respectively;
standard errors clusterd by year and robust to cross-model correlation in parentheses. Their diﬀerence (β1P ) is shown
in column four. Column ﬁve displays β1P from OLS estimation of Equation (3); standard errors clustered by year in
parentheses. Quality controls denoted by 33 include citation count, max. Tj and max. tj ; 3
4 includes max. tj , only
(see Footnote 55). ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
A less than unit value suggests µjP exerts downward pressure on RjW ’s coeﬃcient, thereby
artiﬁcially inﬂating ﬁrst column ﬁgures (see previous section).
Table VII’s remaining columns present results from both strategies meant to deal with
this bias. Columns 2–4 display FGLS estimates. Coeﬃcients on female ratioj from Equa-
tion (6) (β˜1W ) and Equation (7) (β˜1W + β1P ) are shown in columns two and three, respec-
tively. Female-authored working papers and published articles are both better written—but
the readability gap is substantially larger in the latter. Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog and
SMOG scores imply immediate peer review accounts for 40–60 percent of the total (biased)
eﬀect of female ratio in Equation (7); Flesch Reading Ease and Dale-Chall scores indicate a
smaller proportion (30 percent).62 Column four displays their diﬀerence (β1P ); it is positive
and signiﬁcant or highly signiﬁcant for all ﬁve scores.
OLS estimates of β1P from Equation (3) are shown in Table VII’s ﬁnal column. Mag-
nitudes are close to FGLS estimates—conﬁrming earlier conclusions—standard errors are
slightly higher. Both strategies show a signiﬁcant increase in the gender readability gap
ex post. Assuming non-peer review factors are always independent of either its timing or
gender, this establishes the desired causal link.63
62FGLS diﬀerence (β1P , column four) divided by the eﬀect in published articles (β˜1W + β1P , column three).
63The discussion in Footnote 59 also applies to the precise accuracy of the assumption’s phrasing used here.
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Robustness. Timing independence is the principle independence assumption required to
causally link the readability gap with peer review. One external factor in particular may
coincide with this timing: feedback women receive in conferences and seminars. Perhaps
women tighten prose (before or after submission) in response to audience member remarks?
Anecdotal evidence suggests female speakers are given a harder time,64 although I could ﬁnd
no scientiﬁc analysis to support (or contradict) this claim.65 Nevertheless, most participants
are also current (or future) journal referees. Neutral review feedback is inconsistent with
non-neutral presentation feedback when originating from the same group.66
3.4 Investigating readability over authors’ lifetimes
The wider gap post-peer review conﬁrms a causal link with peer review. It does not assure
causality with referee scrutiny. In this section, I evaluate the alternatives: women write more
clearly because of gender diﬀerences in (i) biology/behaviour—e.g., they’re more sensitive to
referee criticism—or (ii) knowledge about referee expectations—e.g., by overestimating the
importance of writing well.
In a dynamic model of authors’ decision-making processes, I show that any gap caused
exclusively by (i) or (ii) declines with experience. Yet the gap does not decline. It widens.
Estimates from pooled subsamples and matching indicate women write more clearly as
their publication count increases; men, possibly less so. This pattern of behaviour suggests
discrimination—either directly in the form of biased referee scrutiny or indirectly from bi-
ased referee assignment (Theorem 1).
3.4.1 Theoretical framework. To organise the analysis, I develop a simple dynamic model
of readability’smarginal impact on an author’s decisionmaking process. It follows an author—
denoted by i—who publishes several articles in prestigious academic journals over the course
of his career. Each article is roughly equivalent in terms of topic, novelty and quality, but
varies on readability.
At stage 0, author i drafts his tth paper and submits it for peer review. Upon receipt,
the journal’s editorial oﬃce assigns the manuscript to a group of referees. The (ﬁnite) set of
all potential review groups is represented by Σ; µi is the set of strictly positive probability
measures on Σ. Σ and µi are known to i.
Let r0it and r˜s0i denote manuscript t’s non-negative draft readability and the initial re-
jection threshold review group s ∈ Σ applies to all papers by author i, respectively. s rejects
the paper at stage 0 if
r0it < r˜
s
0i.
i is otherwise granted a “revise and resubmit” (R&R), yet could still be rejected at stage 1 if
the readability of his revised manuscript,Rit = r0it+r1it, does not meet a second threshold,
Rit < R˜
s
i ,
64A related theory is that women receive more critical feedback in conferences and seminars because they present
their work more often. In a survey of economists, Sarsons (2016) ﬁnds that men and women are equally likely
to present co-authored work but women are actually less likely to present solo-authored work.
65A recent article on Chronicle Vitae discusses the topic and provides speciﬁc examples (Baker, 2015). SXSW
Interactive (a large technology conference that isn’t speciﬁcally linked to academia) cancelled two 2015 panel
discussions on issues related to gender in response to violent online harassment of the (female) speakers.
66Even if this were the case, it implies an entrenched discipline-wide bias.
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where R˜si = r˜
s
0i + r˜
s
1i. All rejections and acceptances are ﬁnal. R˜
s
i ̸= r˜s0i to account for
diﬀerent standards at diﬀerent stages of peer review. r1it, r˜s0i and r˜
s
1i are non-negative; the
latter two are independent.
To aid the revision process, s writes a referee report from which i forms expectations
about R˜si by assigning subjective probabilities pi
s
1it(R) to all R. Unfortunately, the concept
of readability is complex, some referees write insuﬃciently detailed reports and inattentive
or hypersensitive authors misconstrue even perfectly clear advice. This renders i’s interpre-
tation of the report imprecise and his subsequent expectations about R˜si inexact and possibly
specious.
Conditional on r0it, I assume referee reports by s for i are the same for all t and that each
is distinctive enough for i to distinguish s in Σ.67 Consequently, author i’s stage 1 choice of
Rit maximises his (immediate) subjective expected utility given s,
Πs1it(Rit)ui + φi|r0it(r1it)− ci|r0it(r1it). (8)
Πs1it(Rit) is the cumulative sum of pi
s
1it(R) for allR ≤ Rit; ui is the utility of having a paper
accepted in a prestigious journal;68 φi|r0it(r1it) = φi(Rit) − φi(r0it) and ci|r0it(r1it) =
ci(Rit)− ci(r0it) are the satisfaction and cost, respectively, from making changes r1it given
the paper’s initial readability r0it. φi is increasing and concave in its arguments, ci increasing
and convex—marginally higherRit generates proportionally less satisfaction but needs more
eﬀort when the paper is already well written. ci(0) and φi(0) are 0.
Authors’ decisions at stage 0 are myopic; i’s choice of r0it maximises his initial subjective
expected utility for the current paper,∫
Σ
Πs0it(r0it)v
s
1it dµi + φi(r0it)− ci(r0it), (9)
where Πs0it(r0it) is the cumulative sum for all r ≤ r0it of author i’s subjective probabilities
pis0it(r) about r˜
s
0i; v
s
1it is Equation (8) evaluated at the optimal r1it.
Authors update subjective probabilities (i) using relevant information from their own
experience in peer review; and (ii) by observing others’ readability choices and publication
outcomes. When evidence from (i) contradicts evidence from (ii), (i) takes precedence.
These assumptions imply, at a minimum, that i updates Πs0it and Π
s
1it based on conclusive
evidence derived from the choices and outcomes of equivalent peers (Deﬁnition 1)69 and
knowledge acquired during his own prior experience in peer review.70
Deﬁnition 1. Equivalent authors write identical papers in terms of topic, novelty and quality.
67Should s review a future paper by i, i would recognise it as the same (anonymous) group that reviewed his
earlier paper. This does not imply that the report reveals individual referees’ identities.
68Authors probably care about getting their papers accepted and they may care about writing well, but their
marginal utility from the intersection of the two events—i.e., higher utility from writing well only because
the paper is published in a top-four journal (as opposed to a top ﬁeld journal or second-tier general interest
journal)—is assumed to be negligible.
69Speciﬁcally, if i observes with probability 1 that in state s an equivalent author k receives an R&R at r0k, then
Πs0it(r) = 1 for all r ≥ r0k. Similarly, if i observes with probability 1 that in state s, k is accepted at Rk,
then Πs1it(R) = 1 for all R ≥ Rk.
70If i is accepted at stage 1 in time t′ for review group s, then Πs1it(R) = 1 for all t > t
′ and R ≥ Rit′ ;
otherwise, Πs1it(R) = 0 for all t > t
′ and R ≤ Rit′ . Similarly, if i receives an R&R at stage 0 in time t′ for
review group s, then Πs0it(r) = 1 for all t > t
′ and r ≥ r0it′ ; otherwise, Πsit(r) ≤ Πsit′(r) for all t > t′,
r ≤ r0it′ and s ∈ Σ.
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Equation (8) and Equation (9) incorporate a variety of factors that potentially aﬀect
authors’ readability choices—editorial standards (r˜0it and R˜it); ambition (ui); the cost of
drafting and revising manuscripts (ci); an otherwise unexplained intrinsic satisfaction from
writing readable papers (φi). Poor information, overconﬁdence and sensitivity to criticism
are not explicitly included, on the assumption that people do notwant to be poorly informed,
overconﬁdent or excessively sensitive. These factors nevertheless enter Equation (8) and
Equation (9)—and hence inﬂuence choices—via the subjective expectations authors form
about r˜s0i and R˜
s
i .
A singleRit cannot, therefore, establish if and to what extent i’s choices are motivated by
(a) preferences and costs speciﬁc to him (ui, φi, ci), (b) editorial standards and/or referee as-
signment outside his control (r˜0it, R˜it, µi) or (c) miscellaneous confounding factors mopped
by Πs0it and Π
s
1it. Since preferences and costs are time independent, however, an observed
increase in i’s choice of readability at two separate t distinguishes (a) from the combined
impact of (b) and (c).71 i may be more sensitive to criticism and he might prefer writing
more clearly; nevertheless, he improves readability today relative to yesterday only when he
believes it boosts his chances of publishing.
Moreover, because (c) does not reﬂect activities or states the author enjoys, its impact
on choices declines with experience. Authors may miscalculate referee expectations and
misconstrue their reports, but with experience they correct their mistakes. Having ruled
out (a) and holding acceptance rates constant, this implies that a persistent readability gap
between equivalent peers is caused by (b)—i.e., editorial standards and/or referee assignment
beyond authors’ control.
I capture this idea in Theorem 1, where 1s0i(r) and 1
s
1i(R) are indicator functions equal
to 1 if r ≥ r˜s0i and R ≥ R˜si , respectively, and ΣAit is the collection of s ∈ Σ for which
1s0i(r0it)1
s
1i(Rit) = 1. Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Consider two equivalent authors, i and k, that satisfy the following three conditions.
Condition 1. (r0kt, Rkt) ≤ (r0it, Rit) for all s ∈ ΣAit and t > t′ and there existsK ′ > 0 such
that for at least one s ∈ ΣAit and no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0kt, Rkt)|| < K ′.
Condition 2. For at least one t′′ < t′, (r0it′′ , Rit′′) < (r0it′ , Rit′) and there existsK ′′ > 0 such
that for no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0it′′ , Rit′′)|| < K ′′.
Condition 3.
∫
Σ1
s
0i(r0it)1
s
1i(Rit) dµi ≤
∫
Σ1
s
0k(r0kt)1
s
1k(Rkt) dµk for all t > t
′.
Then, almost surely, referee assignment is biased in favour of k,∫
Σ
1s0i(r0kt)1
s
1i(Rkt) dµi <
∫
Σ
1s0i(r0kt)1
s
1i(Rkt) dµk,
or referee scrutiny is biased against i,∫
Σ
1s0i(r0kt)1
s
1i(Rkt) dµi <
∫
Σ
1s0k(r0kt)1
s
1k(Rkt) dµi,
or both.
71The analysis in Section 3.3 similarly establishes that (b) and/or (c) are signiﬁcant factors driving the choice of
Rit. It cannot, however, distinguish between (b) and (c).
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Theorem 1‘s three conditions are suﬃcient to verify discrimination in academic publish-
ing: when female authors’ unconditional probability of acceptance is no higher than men’s
(Condition 3), their current papers are more readable than their past papers (Condition 2)
and also persistentlymore readable than men’s papers (Condition 1) then either editors assign
women “tougher” referees—i.e., those with higher r˜s0i and/or R˜
s
i—or referees apply higher
standards to women’s writing—i.e., r˜s0k < r˜
s
0i and/or R˜
s
k < R˜
s
i for at least one s ∈ Σ.
Measuring discrimination. Theorem 1’s three conditions conﬁrm the presence of discrim-
ination. They principally rely on two identifying assumptions: (i) i and k are equivalent; (ii)
t′ is suﬃciently large—i.e., any errors in i’s beliefs about r˜0i and R˜i are on a path converging
to zero. By assuming amore speciﬁc belief structure at t′, Corollary 1 proposes a conservative
measure of discrimination’s impact on readability choices.
When making revisions, authors choose Rit to maximise Equation (8). As shown in
Appendix B, R⋆i ≤ r0it where R⋆i is the R that solves φ′i(R) = c′i(R). Since R⋆i is i’s
optimal readability in the absence of peer review and R⋆i ≤ r0it, i prefers Rit > r0it only if
r0it < R˜
s
i + e
s
1it, where e
s
1it is his time t error in beliefs about R˜
s
i . So i revises only when
required—and even then, no more than a comfortable minimum to placate referees.
A similar logic governs i’s choice of r0it—now picked to maximise Equation (9). i opts
for r0it > R⋆i only if R
⋆
i < r˜
s
0i+ e
s
0it for at least one s in ΣAit , where e
s
0it is the time t error
in i’s beliefs about r˜s0i. Thus
r0it = max
{
R⋆i , r˜
s
0i + e
s
0it
}
and Rit = max
{
r0it, R˜
s
i + e
s
1it
}
, (10)
where s is the review group inΣAit for which i believes r˜
s
0i is highest—i.e., s ∈ ΣAit satisﬁes
r˜s0i + e
s
0it ≤ r˜s0i + es0it for all s ∈ ΣAit .72
Deﬁne δs0ik and δ
s
1ik as the diﬀerence in readability standards applied to authors i and k
by review group s in time t at stage 0 and 1, respectively:
δs0ik ≡ r˜s0i − r˜s0k and δs1ik ≡ R˜si − R˜sk.
When δs0ik ̸= 0 and/or δs1ik ̸= 0, s employs asymmetric evaluation criteria to i and k’s
work.73 Dissimilar authors may call for asymmetric benchmarks—but if i and k are equiv-
alent, they’re a form of discrimination. Unfortunately, r˜s0i and R˜
s
i are not known to the
researcher and Rit inconsistently estimates them (Equation (10)). As Corollary 1 shows,
however, Rit −Rkt is smaller in magnitude than the true value of stage 1 discrimination by
s or stage 0 discrimination by s.
Corollary 1. Fix s and t > t′ and let i and k be equivalent authors such that i satisﬁes Conditions
1–3 (Theorem 1) relative to k. If (i) esnit = e
s
nkt for stages n = 0, 1 and (ii) ΣAit ⊂ ΣAkt , then
Rit −Rkt ≤ Dik, (11)
where
Dik =
{
δs1ik if r0it < Rit
δs0ik otherwise
.
72As shown in Theorem 1’s proof (Appendix B), i’s beliefs about r˜s0i and R˜
s
i converge from above. Coupled
with Jensen’s inequality, this means r˜s0i + e0it and R˜
s
i + e
s
1it may exceed i’s time t expectations of r˜
s
0i and
R˜si , respectively. At the limit, however, e
s
0it and e
s
1it converge to 0—so as t increases, this “comfort buﬀer”
declines.
73The asymmetry’s direction captured in the sign: positive if s is tougher on i; negative otherwise.
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Corollary 1 identiﬁes a conservative measure of discrimination’s impact on i’s readability.
It also exposes the toxic denouement of one biased s. i’s time t readability choice depends
on discrimination at stage 1 by the group of referees that actually reviewed his paper (s) as
well as discrimination at stage 0 by another review group that (probably) didn’t (s).
Such is the ﬁrst externality from even one rotten apple. From i’s perspective, s spoils the
bunch. Bias from s destabilises s’s attempt to treat i and k fairly. Either i is rejected when
assigned to s or discrimination by s aﬀects i’s readability even when i is reviewed by referees
who do not discriminate.
Moreover, oﬀsetting unfairness with fairness only works when everyone is fair. Asymme-
try from one upsets symmetric criteria applied everywhere else, creating endless imbalance
when some people just will not be fair. If culture and/or behaviour predicate bias against i
and restrain comparable bias against k then, sans intervention, we permanently and unjustly
take from i and give to k.74
Corollary 1 adds two stronger conditions to Theorem 1. According to the ﬁrst, i and k
must be comparably experienced by time t. Corollary 1 actually applies under the weaker
esnit ≤ esnkt, n = 0, 1 (see its proof in Appendix B), but Rit −Rkt may overestimate Dik if
esnkt < e
s
nit for all t > t
′. Nevertheless, esnit − esnkt converges to 0 as t tends to inﬁnity, so
Rit −Rkt consistently predicts the direction of Dik for large enough t.75
The second condition precludes s′ such that s′ is in ΣAit but not in ΣAkt—e.g., because
i’s utility of acceptance exceeds that of k’s. Of course, i’s unconditional acceptance rate is
not higher than k’s (Condition 3), so s′ necessarily oﬀsets some other s′′ such that—because
s′′ discriminates against i—s′′ is in ΣAkt but not in ΣAit . But Rit − Rkt may not fully
counteract the ﬁrst eﬀect; Equation (12) does—providing a conservative estimate of Dik
under Theorem 1’s weaker Condition 3.76
Rit −max {Rit′′ , Rkt} ≤ Dik. (12)
3.4.2 Empirical consistency. If topic, novelty and quality are appropriately controlled for,
then discrimination is present whenTheorem 1’s three conditions hold at large enough t. In
this section, I evaluate whether each condition holds, on average, using the entire sample of
authors. In Section 3.4.3, I use a matching procedure to identify Theorem 1 and generate a
conservative estimate of discrimination’s impact on readability (Corollary 1).
Consider ﬁrst Condition 3—female-authored papers are accepted no more often than
male-authored papers. The articles I evaluate have already been accepted, precluding gender
analysis of acceptance rates. Section 3.4.3 and Appendix D.8 use lifetime publication counts
to partially overcome this. The measure, unfortunately, embodies obvious imperfections.77
74That is, if cultural and/or behavioural factors mean that δsnik > 0 for at least one s ∈ Σ, and there is no
comparable oﬀsetting bias against k and education and/or time cannot eliminate δsnik, then i is at a permanent
disadvantage relative to k.
75See also the discussion in Footnote 72 and Section 3.4.3.
76Although Equation (12) counteracts the impact of any s′ such that s′ is in ΣAit but not in ΣAkt , it comes at
a cost: Equation (12)’s attenuation bias is much larger than the one generated by Equation (11).
77Comparing lifetime publication counts between equivalent authors accounts for most confounding factors
except individual productivity—especially factors related to household responsibilities. Greater responsibility
at home presumably does not aﬀect readability (other than, perhaps, to push women’s scores downward),
but it may impact the number of papers women can write. As shown in Section 3.5, however, motherhood
responsibilities after childbirth do not, in fact, slow women down during the revision process—at least at
Econometrica.
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Figure III: Readability of authors’ tth publication
Notes. Mean Flesch Reading Ease scores grouped by authors’ ﬁrst, second, …, tth, … publication in the data. Lines of best ﬁt are
estimated separately for men and women on the grouped averages using OLS. Dotted line indicates out-of-sample forecast (the
largest t for a woman is 15; for a man it’s 45).
Luckily, gender’s impact on acceptance rates has been extensively studied elsewhere. To
the best of my knowledge, publication outcomes expose no female advantage anywhere, ever.
Blank (1991) found that 12.7 and 10.6 percent of male- and female-authored papers were
accepted at the American Economic Review , respectively.78 A study of JAMA’s editorial pro-
cess indicated that 44.8 percent of referees accept male-authored papers as is or if suitably
revised; 29.6 percent summarily reject them. Corresponding ﬁgures for female-authored
papers were 38.3 and 33.3 percent, respectively (Gilbert et al., 1994).79 There are also no
gender diﬀerences in acceptance rates to NBER’s Summer Institute programme (Chari and
Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017).80 Ceci et al. (2014) provide a much more comprehensive re-
search review on the subject. Their conclusion: “When it comes to actual manuscripts sub-
mitted to actual journals, the evidence for gender fairness is unequivocal: there are no sex
diﬀerences in acceptance rates.” (Ceci et al., 2014, p. 111).
The data more cleanly identify Conditions 1 and 2. As their careers advance, women do
writemore clearly: their average readability scores are 1–5 percent higher than the readability
of their ﬁrst papers; their latest papers 1–7 percent higher (Appendix C). For aman, however,
his average and last paper may be more poorly written than the ﬁrst.
Figure III plots mean Flesch Reading Ease scores grouped by authors’ tth article; as the
78Women’s double-blind acceptance rate was 10 percent (11 percent for men); their single-blind acceptance rate
was 11.2 percent (versus 15 percent for men).
79The ﬁgures presented here aggregate responses in Tables 3 and 4 from Gilbert et al. (1994, p. 141). They av-
erage all individual referee recommendations, of which papers usually received several. The authors found no
gender diﬀerence in ﬁnal manuscript acceptance rates—although they did ﬁnd that manuscripts withmale cor-
responding authors were summarily rejected more often (41.7 percent as opposed to 37.4 percent for women).
80No gender diﬀerence was found in the pooled sample, but male-authored papers submitted to ﬁnance work-
shops were two percent more likely to be accepted; the eﬀect is weakly signiﬁcant. NBER’s annual Summer
Institute Programme is a selective three week economics conference.
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count increases, men andwomen diverge.81Table VIII tests signiﬁcance of that divergence by
FGLS estimation of Equation (1) (omittingRit−1) on subsamples corresponding to authors’
ﬁrst (t = 1), second (t = 2), third (t = 3), fourth and ﬁfth (t = 4–5) and sixth and
up (t ≥ 6) articles published in the journals and time periods covered by the data. Only
marginal eﬀects on co-authoring with women for female authors are shown (β1). Final
column is a population-averaged estimate on the pooled sample. Regressions in columns
(t = 1) to (t ≥ 6) are weighted by 1/Nj (see Section 3.2), standard errors adjusted for two-
way clustering on editor and author and corrected for cross-model correlation. Final column
estimates are unweighted, error correlations are speciﬁed by an auto-regressive process of
order one and standard errors are clustered on author.
All ﬁgures agree—women write better—but the magnitude and signiﬁcance of that
diﬀerence increases as t increases.82 Between columns (t = 1) and (t = 2), the gap
marginally widens but is not signiﬁcant; after that, it triples (at least); the increase is signif-
icant (p < 0.05) for all ﬁve scores.83 At higher publication counts, estimates are somewhat
smaller than column (t = 3)—but still larger than columns (t = 1) and (t = 2)—although
ﬁgures are only weakly signiﬁcant and suﬀer from very small samples of female authors.84
First-time publications are not driving the observed readability gap. Figure III suggests
little or no gender diﬀerence when t = 1; Table VIII backs this up. Coeﬃcients in column
(t = 1) are imprecise, roughly half the size of those from a pooled regression (last column)
and a fraction the size of estimates in columns (t = 3), (t = 4–5) and (t ≥ 6). Wald tests
(Appendix D.4) reject equality of β1 in the ﬁrst and third models at p < 0.01 for the Flesch
Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid and SMOG scores and p < 0.05 for the Gunning Fog and
Dale-Chall scores.
3.4.3 Matching. In light of Theorem 1, the preceding evidence forcefully hints that aca-
demic publishing is biased against female economists: on average, female-authored papers
are accepted no more often than male-authored papers (Condition 3), yet women improve
their writing over time (Condition 2) and write better than men at all t (Condition 1).
Nevertheless, the set of women to satisfy one condition is conceivably orthogonal to sets
that satisfy others; for Theorem 1 to apply, they must overlap. To address this concern, I
match female to male authors on characteristics that predict the topic, novelty and quality
of research. In addition to explicitly accounting for author equivalence—the primary condi-
tional independence assumption behindTheorem 1—matched pair comparisons: (i) identify
the gender most likely to satisfy all conditions simultaneously; and (ii) generate (conserva-
tive) estimates of the eﬀect of higher standards on authors’ readability (Corollary 1).
Estimation strategy. Holding acceptance rates constant, Theorem 1 rules out confound-
ing factors—e.g., sensitivity to criticism and individual preferences—by comparing readabil-
ity between equivalent authors experienced in peer review (Condition 1) and within authors
before and after gaining that experience (Condition 2).
81In an earlier version of this paper, I estimated the mean additional contribution each paper makes to an author’s
readability (Hengel, 2016, pp. 23–24). This analysis included the full set of controls used in Section 3.2. The
results and conclusions were similar to those presented here.
82See Appendix D.4 for coeﬃcient equality test statistics.
83Figures in columns (t = 2) and (t = 3) of Table VIII are roughly in line with third column estimates in
Table VII—on average, t = 2.7 for female-authored articles released ﬁrst as NBER working papers.
84Only 40 female authors have 4–5 publications in the data; 28 have six or more. (512men have 4–5 publications;
545 have more than that.)
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Table VIII: Gender gap in readability at increasing t
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4–5 t ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease 0.26 1.57* 4.67*** 2.73 3.35 1.66**
(0.63) (0.91) (1.14) (1.97) (2.14) (0.72)
Flesch-Kincaid 0.07 0.18 0.82*** 0.58 0.62 0.21
(0.15) (0.21) (0.25) (0.41) (0.43) (0.15)
Gunning Fog 0.20 0.38 1.10*** 0.83* 0.88 0.44**
(0.16) (0.25) (0.30) (0.47) (0.54) (0.18)
SMOG 0.11 0.27 0.73*** 0.64* 0.66* 0.33**
(0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.37) (0.38) (0.13)
Dale-Chall 0.07 0.10 0.34*** 0.29* 0.43* 0.17**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17) (0.24) (0.07)
No. observations 6,876 2,827 1,674 1,908 2,777 12,013
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. β1 from FGLS estimation of Equation (1) without lagged dependent variable. First column restricts sample to authors’
ﬁrst publication in the data (t = 1), second column to their second (t = 2), etc. Regressions weighted by 1/Nj (see Sec-
tion 3.2). Standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for two-way clustering (editor and author) and cross-model correlation.
Final column estimates from an unweighted population-averaged regression; error correlations speciﬁed by an auto-regressive
process of order one and standard errors (in parentheses) adjusted for one-way clustering on author. Quality controls denoted
by 31 include citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects; 3
5 includes citation count, only. ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
I consider authors “experienced” by t = 3. Authors with one or two top-four publications
are probably tenured and well-established in their ﬁelds. By publication three, all frequently
referee (and some edit) prestigious economics journals. I assume this accumulated experience
means equivalent authors are equally accurate about r˜0i3 and R˜i3, so remaining errors are no
longer gender speciﬁc: esni3 = e
s
nk3, n = 0, 1 (Corollary 1).
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To account for equivalence, I matched every female author with three or more publi-
cations (121) to her closest male counterpart (1,553). Matches were made based on the
probability of treatment (female) from a probit model with the following co-variates:86 (1)
Ti; (2) mean Nit; (3) minimum order in an issue; (4) fraction of papers ﬁrst-authored by
i; (5) maximum citation count; (6) maximum institutional rank; (7) mean publication year;
(8) fraction of papers published per decade; (9) fraction of papers published by each journal;
and (10) number of articles per primary JEL category.87 Fractions, means, minimums and
maximums were calculated over Ti. Co-variate balance pre- and post-match are shown in
Appendix D.5. Appendix D.7 lists each matched pair.
r˜s0i and R˜
s
i may be inﬂuenced by factors that vary with t: female ratio, journal, year, co-
85Recall that esnit − esnkt converges to 0, so for large enough t Equation (11) and/or Equation (12) predict the
direction ofDik even when errors remain gender-speciﬁc. (See discussions in the next section.)
86The probability of treatment was estimated using the entire sample (771 female authors; 6,105 male authors).
Matches were restricted to authors with three or more publications, ex post.
87I eschewedmeans in favour of minimum order in an issue, maximum citation count andmaximum institutional
rank on the assumption that an author’s “quality” is principally a function of his best paper.
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Table IX: R̂i3 − R̂k3 (Condition 1) and R̂i3 − R̂i1 (Condition 2)
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
Condition 1
R̂i3 − R̂k3 8.798*** 1.610*** 2.629*** 1.876*** 0.844***
(1.729) (0.360) (0.438) (0.313) (0.162)
Condition 2
R̂i3 − R̂i1 (women) 4.290*** 0.892*** 1.310*** 0.792*** 0.004
(1.544) (0.316) (0.388) (0.285) (0.133)
R̂k3 − R̂k1 (men) −3.216** −0.722** −1.275*** −0.893*** −0.544***
(1.397) (0.304) (0.349) (0.243) (0.115)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (104 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). R̂it and R̂kt are observation-
speciﬁc readability scores estimated at female ratio equal to 0 for men, 1 for women and t = 3 median values of remaining
t-dependent co-variates (see Appendix D.5 and text for more details). Figures are weighted by the frequency observations
are used in a match. Degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
author characteristics and stereotypes about authors’ institutions. R̂it accounts for this. It
reconstructs Rit at female ratio equal to 1 for women, 0 for men and median t = 3 values of
other co-variates—number of co-authors, institutional rank, institutional rank of the high-
est ranked co-author, t for the most experienced co-author, publication year, dummies for
each journal—using relevant coeﬃcients and residuals from four separate time- and gender-
speciﬁc regressions on readability.88 (See Appendix D.6 for regression output.) Throughout
the next section (and appropriate appendices), standard errors adjust for the degrees of free-
dom lost when generating R̂it.89
Results. Table IX’s ﬁrst row compares equivalent authors (holding experience constant):
senior female economists write more readably than their male counterparts with identical
experience. Table IX’s last two rows compare authors before and after gaining that experience
(holding gender and preferences constant): women write more clearly once they “learn the
ropes” in peer review; equivalent men do not. Meanwhile, lifetime publication counts—a
crude approximation for acceptance rates—indicate men’s more poorly written papers are
accepted at least as frequently as women’s.90
Table IX and average publication counts conﬁrm Section 3.4.2’s analysis. Table X goes
further. It tests if Conditions 1 and 2 are both satisﬁed within each matched pair. Its ﬁrst
and second panels display themean (ﬁrst column) and standard deviation (second column) of
Dik—Equation (11)’s conservative estimate of Dik (Corollary 1)—and observation counts
(third column) from the set of matched pairs in which one member satisﬁes both conditions.
In the ﬁrst panel, the female member does—suggesting discrimination against women—in
the second, it’s the male member—indicating discrimination against men.91 Male scores
88That is, a dual-authored paper published in 2008 in the American Economic Review where t = 3 for i and his
co-author and their institutions rank 48 and 54, respectively.
89Speciﬁcally, standard errors are inﬂated by a factor of 1.2.
90See Footnote 77 for a discussion of the limitations of using publication counts to proxy for acceptance rates.
Please also refer to Section 3.4.2 for a more thorough review of the (substantial) prior research on gender
neutrality and journals’ acceptance rates. It too ﬁnds no female advantage in journals’ acceptance rates.
91The co-variates used to generate a match remain relatively balanced when the sample of observations is re-
stricted toDik ̸= 0 (see Appendix D.5 and the next section for a discussion).
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Table X: Dik, Equation (11)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 18.32 12.94 58 −12.42 10.58 21 6.69*** 6.02***
(1.62) (1.68)
Flesch Kincaid 3.70 2.68 61 −2.05 2.11 25 1.40*** 1.22***
(0.34) (0.35)
Gunning Fog 5.11 3.31 62 −3.12 2.57 17 2.23*** 2.03***
(0.42) (0.44)
SMOG 3.64 2.35 63 −2.44 1.95 16 1.58*** 1.44***
(0.30) (0.32)
Dale-Chall 1.94 1.30 48 −0.96 0.65 23 0.57*** 0.51***
(0.15) (0.16)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (104 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). First and second panels display conditional
means, standard deviations and observation counts ofDik (Equation (11)) from subpopulations of matched pairs in which the woman
or man, respectively, satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2. Third panel displays mean Dik over all observations. To account for the 30–40
percent of pairs for which Theorem 1 is inconclusive, (1) sets Dik = 0, while (2) sets Dik = R̂i3 − R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i
female, k male) and zero, otherwise. Male scores are subtracted from female scores;Dik is positive in panel one and negative in panel
two. Dik weighted by frequency observations are used in a match; degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses (panel
three, only). ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
are subtracted from female scores, soDik is positive in panel one and negative in panel two.
Evidence of discrimination was present in roughly 65 percent of matched pairs—and in
three-quarters of those, the member discriminated against was female.92 Moreover, Dik is
(on average) almost twice as large (in absolute value) when discrimination is against women.
Figure IV displays Dik ’s distribution across the ﬁve scores. Pink bars correspond to
matched pairs in which Dik is positive (discrimination against women); blue bars reﬂect
those for which Dik is negative (discrimination against men).
In the absence of systemic discrimination against women (or men), Dik would sym-
metrically distribute around zero. It does not. When men are discriminated against, Dik
clusters at zero. When women are discriminated against, Dik spreads out. Furthermore,
instances of obvious discrimination are predominately against women: Dik is seven times
more likely to be one standard deviation above zero than below it.
Table X’s ﬁnal panel averagesDik over all observations. To account for the 30–40 percent
of pairs for which Theorem 1 is inconclusive, (1) sets Dik = 0, while (2) sets Dik = R̂i3 −
R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i female, k male) and zero, otherwise.93
Results conﬁrm conclusions drawn from Figure IV and the ﬁrst two panels of Table X.
Discrimination by editors and/or referees predominately aﬀects female authors. MeanDik is
positive and signiﬁcant in both columns for all ﬁve scores. Thanks to higher standards, senior
female economists write (at least) nine percent more clearly than they otherwise would.94
Appendix D.8 replicates Table X using Equation (12) to estimate Dik. Results are very
similar (and conclusions identical) to the analysis presented here.
92For 30–40 percent of pairs, neither member satisﬁed both Conditions 1 and 2, rendering Theorem 1’s test for
discrimination inconclusive.
93That is, if the experienced man writes more readably than the experienced woman, then the eﬀect is always
attributed to discrimination against men; if the experienced woman writes more readably than the experienced
man, however, the eﬀect is attributed to discrimination against women only if Condition 2 is likewise satisﬁed.
94Table X, column (1) divided by the mean male R̂k3 (Appendix D.8).
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Figure IV: Distributions of Dik, Equation (11)
Robustness. Conclusions drawn from Table X are principally predicated on two assump-
tions: (i) i and k are equivalent; (ii) t is suﬃciently large—i.e., t > t′ (esnit is on the conver-
gence path to zero for n = 0, 1) and any errors in i’s beliefs about r˜0i and R˜i are suﬃciently
small.95 If either is violated, discrimination against women cannot be inferred from an over-
representation of matched pairs with Dik > 0.
The ﬁrst assumption depends on match accuracy. Post-match co-variates are well bal-
anced (AppendixD.5). They remainwell balanced—and similar to thematched population—
when restricted to pairs satisfying Dik > 0 and/or Dik < 0 (Appendix D.5). To facilitate
further scrutiny, Appendix D.7 lists the names of economists in each pair.
Matches are sensitive to the choice and construction of variables and the model and
method used to estimate propensity scores. Outcomes, however, are not. After controlling
for Ti, decade, journal and JEL code, matches using alternative variables (e.g., minimum ci-
tation counts and mean institutional rank) and speciﬁcations (e.g., logit and no replacement)
generate similar ﬁgures and conclusions.96
The second assumption demands a “suﬃciently large” t. For diagnosing discrimination,
“suﬃciently large” means t′ < 3 and the diﬀerence in i and k’s error in beliefs at t = 3 is
smaller thanDik. Forty-eight percent of all women with three or more top publications sat-
isfy Conditions 1 and 2 when compared to equivalent men.97 Among them,Dik is far from
zero (Table X, ﬁrst column): these women write, on average, 29 percent more clearly than
95I use “error” and “mistake” to refer to anything that would cause authors to write more (or less) clearly than they
would if r˜s0i and R˜
s
i were known. This includes actual mistakes in judgement as well as character components—
e.g., conscientiousness or risk aversion—that impact beliefs and/or the optimal choice set under uncertainty.
96Alternative speciﬁcations are not shown, but are available on request (erin.hengel@gmail.com).
97Women are the better writers in 73 percent of matched pairs. In 34 percent of those, however, the woman
did not improve her writing between t = 1 and t = 3 (Condition 2), thus rendering Theorem 1’s test for
discrimination inconclusive.
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equivalent men with identical experience.98 It is unlikely that half of all female economists
with three top publications—plus many more second-tier publications and substantial ex-
perience refereeing and editing themselves—make mistakes of this magnitude.
Interpreting Dik as a causal, conservative estimate of discrimination’s impact on read-
ability requires the stronger assumption that esni3 = e
s
nk3.
99 When violated, I can no longer
conclude that Dit conservatively estimates Dik.
100 Nevertheless, esnit − esnkt is converging
to zero and likely very small at t = 3. Any upward bias from esnkt < e
s
nit —i.e., from senior
female economists still making more mistakes about reviewers’ thresholds than equivalent
men even after previously publishing two top papers—is probably small and arguably oﬀset
by the downward bias already baked into Dik.
101
Finally, causal interpretation technically requires that three additional criteria are also
met. Assuming discrimination against i: (i) i’s acceptance rate is nomore than k’s; (ii) r0k3 ≤
r0i3—i.e., i’s draft readability is at least as high as k’s; and (iii) r0i1 ≤ r0i3—i.e., i’s draft
readability at t = 3 is at least as high as his draft readability at t = 1. As already discussed,
(i) rules out the possibility that i is appropriately rewarded (relative to k) for writing more
clearly. (ii) and (iii) eliminate situations in which women write more clearly during peer
review to compensate for poorer writing—and consequently higher desk rejection rates—
before peer review.
Unfortunately, my data do not perfectly identify acceptance rates nor do I have t = 1 and
t = 3 draft readability scores for every matched pair. Nevertheless, the data I do have and
prior research strongly suggest (i)–(iii) not only hold on average, but do not exert upward
bias on my estimate ofDik, more generally. First, the previous section reviews the literature
on gender neutrality in journals’ acceptance rates. Women are not accepted more often than
men. In Appendix D.8, I attempt to control for them explicitly by adding the requirement
Ti ≤ Tk or Tk ≤ Ti to categorise matched pairs as discrimination against i or k, respectively.
Results are similar; conclusions unchanged. As shown in Section 3.3, women’s draft papers
are indeed more readable than men’s. Appendix A provides further conﬁrmation. It plots
the readability of women’s and men’s draft and published papers over increasing t. Women’s
drafts are more readable than men’s drafts at t = 3 and more readable than their own earlier
drafts at t = 1.
3.5 Duration of peer review
“Writing simply and directly only looks easy” (Kimble, 1994, p. 53). An essay’s rhetorical
competency is highly correlatedwith the length of time one is given to compose it (Hartvigsen,
1981; Kroll, 1990). Skilled writers spend more time contemplating a writing assignment,
brainstorming and editing. They also write fewer words per minute and produce more
drafts (Faigley and Witte, 1981; Stallard, 1974).
Since writing simply and directly takes time, one observable repercussion will be pro-
longed peer review for female authors. To investigate, I turn toEconometrica, the only journal
98Table X, ﬁrst column divided by the mean male R̂k3 (Appendix D.8).
99Dik actually remains a causal, conservative estimate of the impact of discrimination against women under the
weaker assumption esni3 ≤ esnk3, n = 0, 1 (i female, k male). See the proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix B.
100Speciﬁcally, this assumption is violated if at t = 3 the women listed in Appendix D.7 make more (positive)
mistakes about r˜s0i and/or R˜
s
i than the men they are matched to. For Dik to remain a conservative estimate
ofDik, women’s mistakes must be no greater than men’s mistakes at t = 3.
101For a description of this downward bias, see the discussion on Corollary 1 in Section 3.4.1 and the proof of
Corollary 1 in Appendix B.
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Figure V: Distribution of review times at Econometrica
Notes. Sample 2,446 articles. Bars are proportional to the number of papers published in Econometrica with a given review time
(months between ﬁrst submission and ﬁnal acceptance). Blue bars represent papers written only by men (2,397); pink bars are
papers written only by women (49). Source: Econometrica.
to make disaggregated data on the revision process publicly available.
Figure V is a histogram of time (in months) between dates papers are ﬁrst submitted to
and their ﬁnal revisions received byEconometrica’s editorial oﬃce. Blue bars represent articles
written only by men, pink bars are those just by women. The 180 papers co-authored by men
and women are not included.
Since 1950, Econometrica published 53 papers authored entirely by women.102 As Fig-
ure V illustrates, their review times disproportionately cluster in the distribution’s right tail:
articles by women are six times more likely to experience delays above the 75th percentile
than they are to enjoy speedy revisions below the 25th.103
For a more precise appraisal, I build on a model by Ellison (2002, Table 6, p. 963) and
estimate Equation (13):
revision durationj =β0 + β1 female ratioj + β2motherj + β3 birthj
+ β4 max tj + β5 no. pagesj + β6Nj
+ β7 orderj + β8 no. citationsj + θXj + εj ,
(13)
where motherj and birthj are binary variables equal to 1 if article j ’s authors were all moth-
ers to children younger than ﬁve and gave birth, respectively, at some point during peer
review,104 max tj is the number of prior papers published in any of the top four economics
journals by article j ’s most proliﬁc co-author, no. pagesj refers to the page length of the pub-
102Submit-accept times were not available for four of these articles (see Section 2).
103Despite making up just 2 percent of the sample, one such paper holds the record for longest review: Andrea
Wilson’s “Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing” (November, 2014). Ms. Wilson’s paper
took a decade to get published.
104If one co-author goes on maternity leave or has young children, I assume another co-author manages the
revision process unless she, too, faces similar family commitments.
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Table XI: Revision duration at Econometrica
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female ratio 5.290** 6.632*** 6.636*** 5.541*** 6.654*** 8.797***
(2.011) (2.164) (2.144) (2.051) (2.150) (2.719)
Max. tj −0.163** −0.169** −0.164** −0.164** −0.163** −0.169*
(0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.087)
No. pages 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.206***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.042)
N 1.020** 0.973** 0.963** 1.007** 0.970** 1.149
(0.443) (0.442) (0.443) (0.443) (0.443) (0.698)
Order 0.223** 0.221** 0.218** 0.221** 0.220** 0.496**
(0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.218)
No. citations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Mother −6.660** −10.934*** −17.672***
(2.681) (3.212) (3.285)
Birth −2.252 7.579* 12.337**
(3.360) (4.167) (5.588)
Constant 37.708*** 37.596*** 37.787*** 37.692*** 37.892*** 14.853***
(2.038) (2.080) (2.045) (2.047) (2.057) (2.791)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
JEL (primary) eﬀects 3
No. observations 2,626 2,610 2,626 2,626 2,626 1,281
Notes. (2) excludes papers authored only by women who gave birth (9 articles) and/or had a child younger than ﬁve (16 articles) at
some point during peer review. Coeﬃcients fromOLS estimation of Equation (13); standard errors clustered by year in parentheses.
***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
lished article, orderj is the order in which article j appeared in an issue and no. citationsj
are the number of subsequent papers citing j.105
Table XI displays results across a range of speciﬁcations. Column (1) does not control for
motherhood or childbirth; (2) drops papers authored by women who had children younger
than ﬁve and/or gave birth during peer review; (3) controls for motherhood but not child-
birth; (4) controls for childbirth but not motherhood; (5) controls for both childbirth and
motherhood; (6) includes ﬁxed eﬀects for primary JEL categories.106
Every paper published in Econometrica undergoes extensive review, but the consistently
large and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on female ratio suggests women bear the worst of
it.107 The average male-authored paper takes 18.5 months to complete all revisions; papers
by women need more than half a year longer.108
Why? Well, it’s not because of motherhood. Yes, giving birth slows down review—
responding to referees is apparently put on hold for the ﬁrst year of a newborn’s life—but
105I control for all signiﬁcant factors identiﬁed by Ellison (2002). His work evaluates whether author compo-
sitional eﬀects contributed to higher mean-accept times at AER, Econometrica, JPE, QJE and the Review of
Economic Studies.
106JEL classiﬁcations are only available for papers published after 1990 (see Section 2); Table XI’s column (6)
estimates Equation (13) on only half of the data.
107This conclusion is robust to altering the age-threshold on motherj (see Appendix D.9).
108Based on results in (5). Male eﬀect estimated with zero female co-authors (standard error 0.102).
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having a young child has the opposite eﬀect. A pause for childbirth is expected; a productiv-
ity boost from pre-schoolers is not. Perhaps wanting to spend time with the kids motivates
women to get organised? Or, maybe the most organised women are the only ones having
children? The former suggests motherhood is not the productivity killer it’s rumoured to
be—at least among highly educated women. The latter implies only superstar women feel
academic careers and motherhood are simultaneously manageable.109 Both interpretations
are provocative, but should be made with caution given (i) counter-intuitive results, (ii) ob-
taining an unbiased estimate of β2 was not this study’s objective and (iii) motherj equals one
for only 16 articles in the sample.110
As for Table XI’s remaining coeﬃcients, all are signiﬁcant or highly signiﬁcant and cor-
respond to earlier estimates by Ellison (2002). Longer papers take more time to review,
as do papers with more co-authors and those that appear earlier in an issue. Authors with
an established publication history and highly cited papers (possibly) enjoy marginally faster
reviews.111
4 Discussion
Agender readability gap exists. It’s still there after including editor, journal and year eﬀects—
meaning we cannot blame speciﬁc policies or attitudes in the 50s, long since overcome. The
gap is unaﬀected by ﬁeld controls, so it’s not that women research topics that are easier to ex-
plain. Perhaps it’s caused by factors correlated with gender but actually linked to authors’ (or
co-authors’) competence as economists or ﬂuency in English? If so, institution and native
speaker dummies would reduce it. They do not.112
The gap grows between ﬁrst draft and ﬁnal publication and over the course of women’s
careers. This precludes systemic bias by article- or author-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects—e.g., inborn
advantages and one-oﬀ improvements in response to external circumstances unrelated to
peer review.
It likewise rules out gender diﬀerences in (i) biology/behaviour—e.g., sensitivity to ref-
eree criticism113—or (ii) knowledge about referee expectations. If diligently addressing ev-
ery referee concern has no apparent upside—acceptance rates are unaﬀected—and a very
clear downside—constant redrafting takes time—shouldn’t even oversensitive, ill-informed
women eventually re-examine beliefs… and start acting more like men (Theorem 1)? Yet
this is not what we observe. The largest investments in writing well are made by female
economists with greatest exposure to peer review—i.e., those with the best opportunity to
update their priors.
109A third hypothesis is that referees (possibly responding to editors) demand fewer revisions when women have
young children. Because reviewers are unlikely to have this information—based on my own experience, it is
remarkably diﬃcult to ﬁnd out—I (perhaps unfairly) give this interpretation less weight.
110The count increases to 17 and 19 articles when motherj ’s threshold is deﬁned as children younger than ten
and 18, respectively (see Appendix D.9).
111Ellison (2002)’s analysis includes a dummy variable for female authorship; it is positive post–1990 but not
signiﬁcant (it is negative and insigniﬁcant before that). His paper does not discuss the ﬁnding.
112I also conducted a primitive surname analysis (see Hengel, 2016, pp. 35–36). It suggests that the female
authors in my data are no more or less likely to be native English speakers.
113While women do appear more internally responsive to feedback—criticism has a bigger impact on their self-
esteem—available evidence suggests they aren’t any more externally responsive to it, i.e., women and men are
equally likely to change behaviour and alter performance after receiving feedback (Johnson and Helgeson,
2002; Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989).
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Women’s papers are more likely assigned female referees (Abrevaya and Hamermesh,
2012; Gilbert et al., 1994).114 If female referees are more demanding critics, clearer writing
could reﬂect their tougher reviews.115 Women concentrate in particular ﬁelds, so it’s natural
their papers are more often assigned female referees. However, for the readability gap to
exist only because of specialisation, controlling for JEL classiﬁcation should explain it.116 It
does not. In fact, even including 718 tertiary JEL category dummies has virtually no eﬀect.
So if referee assignment is causing the gap, it’s only because journals disproportionately refer
female-authored papers to the toughest critics. Meaning it isn’t referees who are biased—it’s
editors.117
A ﬁnal alternative is rather uncomfortable. Perhaps female-authored manuscripts de-
serve more criticism because they aren’t as good? As mentioned earlier, factors correlated
with gender but actually related to competency should decline when appropriate proxies are
included. The sample itself is one such proxy—these are, after all, only articles published
in the top four economics journals. Adding other controls—author institution, total ar-
ticle count, citation counts and published order in an issue—has no eﬀect.118 The gap is
widest for the most productive economists and even exists among articles originally released
as NBER working papers—both presumably very clear signals of merit.
Yet I cannot rule out the possibility that women’s work is systematically worse than
men’s—or that the female and male authors in Section 3.4.3 are not really equivalent. (To
decide for yourself, see Appendix D.7.) And if this is true, referees should peruse our papers
more carefully—a byproduct of which could be better written papers after-the-fact or more
attractive prose compensating for structural weaknesses before it.119
“Quality” is subjective; measurement, not easy. Nevertheless, attempts using citation
counts and journal acceptance rates do not indicate that men’s research is any better: as
discussed in Section 3.4.1, gender has virtually zero impact on the latter;120 a review of past
114Note that women are only a fraction of all referees—8 percent in 1986 (Blank, 1991), 10 percent in
1994 (Hamermesh, 1994) and 14 percent in 2013 (Torgler and Piatti, 2013). Abrevaya and Hamermesh
(2012) report female-authored papers were only slightly more likely to be assigned a female referee between
1986–1994, although matching does increase in 2000–2008.
115It’s not so clear whether their reports are anymore critical. A study speciﬁc to post-graduate biologists suggests
yes (Borsuk et al., 2009); another analysing past reviews in an economics ﬁeld journal does not (Abrevaya and
Hamermesh, 2012).
116Speciﬁcally, men and women publishing in the same ﬁeld face the same pool of referees. Controlling for that
pool would account for gender diﬀerences in readability.
117This is a form of biased referee assignment (Theorem 1). A similar argument contends that female research
is more provocative, and more provocative work warrants more scrutiny. If this were true, controlling for
JEL classiﬁcation would also reduce (or eliminate) the gap—unless women’s work is systematically more
provocative even among researchers in very narrow ﬁelds. Yet provocative work is (presumably) highly cited
work, and there is no discernible gender diﬀerence in citation counts (Ceci et al., 2014). Alternatively, perhaps
the wider public excessively scrutinises female work, and referees respond similarly to minimise blowback.
This explanation assumes a wider public capable of discrediting our work—a view many economists would
(privately) disagree with. In any case, economics employs advanced mathematics and technical language,
making it especially inaccessible to a layperson.
118Published order in an issue refers to the order an article appears in a particular issue (i.e., one for the lead
article, two for the second article, etc.). This control was introduced as a a set of indicator variables. See
Hengel (2016, p. 42 and p. 44) for regression output.
119It does seem contradictory, however, that women would be capable of writing better than men—even before
referee input (Table VII)—but incapable of producing similar quality research. One is inclined to believe
clarity of thought and quality of research to go hand-in-hand, although I am not aware of any study on the
topic.
120Journals may have a policy of publishing female-authored research over equal (or even better) male work. If
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studies on male vs. female citations ﬁnd four in which women’s papers received fewer, six
where they were cited more and eight with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (Ceci et al., 2014).
More complicated, multi-factor explanations could resolve inconsistencies present when
each is analysed in isolation. Perhaps female economists are perfectionists, and it gets
stronger with age?121 Maybe women actually enjoy being poorly informed, overconﬁdent
and sensitive to criticism—or (more likely) I may have otherwise misspeciﬁed the author’s
objective function in Section 3.4.1. It is also possible that the statistically signiﬁcant rela-
tionships this paper documents are unfortunate (particularly for me!) ﬂukes.
Still, no explanation matches the simplicity and believability of biased referees and/or
editors. Coherence and economy do not establish fact, but they are useful guides. This sin-
gle explanation neatly accounts for all observed patterns. If reviewers apply higher standards
to female-authored papers, those papers undergo more thorough review. Added scrutiny
should improve women’s exposition but lengthen review times—as seen in Section 3.5.
The rewards from clearer writing are presumably internalised, meaning women gradually
improve—which they do, as illustrated in Section 3.4.
Moreover, several studies document a gender diﬀerence in critical feedback of similar
form—employee performance reviews and student evaluations.122 Ongoing research sug-
gests female workers are held to higher standards in job assessments. They are acknowledged
less for creativity and technical expertise, their contributions are infrequently connected to
business outcomes; guidance or praise supervisors do oﬀer is vague (Correll and Simard,
2016).123
Students display a similar bias. Data from Rate My Professors suggest female lectur-
ers should be “helpful”, “clear”, “organised” and “friendly”. Men, instead, are praised (and
criticised) for being “smart”, “humble” or “cool” (Schmidt, 2015).124 A study of teaching
evaluations similarly ﬁnds students value preparation, organisation and clarity in female in-
structors; their male counterparts are considered more knowledgable, praised for their “an-
imation” and “leadership” and given more credit for contributing to students’ intellectual
development (Boring, 2017).
4.1 Open review
Academia’s female productivity gap is as stubborn as the business world’s pay gap; yet, if
every paper a woman writes needs sixmoremonths to ﬁnish review, our “Publishing Paradox”
seems much less paradoxical.125
so, acceptance rates are not an unbiased indicator of quality.
121While women score higher on maintaining order (Feingold, 1994)—a trait including organisation and
perfectionism—signiﬁcant diﬀerences are not universally present in all cultures (Costa et al., 2001). More-
over, diﬀerences that are present decline—or even reverse—as people age (Weisberg et al., 2011).
122No one (to my knowledge) has tested whether men and women receive diﬀerent critical feedback in peer
review reports,
123A similar phenomenon exists in online fora. TheGuardian commissioned researchers to study 70million com-
ments on its website. It found female and black writers attract disproportionately abusive threads (Gardiner
et al., 2016).
124These conclusions are based on an observational account of the data.
125Virtually every study on gender diﬀerences in scientiﬁc publishing rates ﬁnd men more productive than
women (for a list, see Ceci et al., 2014). It’s no diﬀerent in my data: women published on average 1.7
articles; men managed 2.4—and with far more concentration in the distribution’s right tail (for example, 56
men have published 16 or more times in the data, but no woman). Women produce fewer papers even when
they don’t have any children (Ceci et al., 2014). Appropriate controls for teaching and service do not account
for it (Xie and Shauman, 2005), and it isn’t a question of time, since female academics work just as many
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Is the answer double-blind review? Probably not. Double-blind review cannot stop
referees from guessing authors’ identities—which they did with surprising accuracy before
the internet (Blank, 1991), and presumably perfect accuracy after it.126
Instead, eliminate single-blind review, too. A randomised controlled trial at the British
Journal of Psychiatry suggests referee reports are better quality and less abusive when identities
are known (Walsh et al., 2000). Posting them online—as the British Medical Journal does—
virtually guarantees continuous, independent audits by outside researchers.127 Worries that
reviews are less critical and/or relationships are strained are either unfounded or alleviated by
the deep pool of referees common to general interest journals (van Rooyen et al., 2010; van
Rooyen et al., 1999). Open review does incur costs—some people refuse to participate and
those that don’t spendmarginally more time drafting reports (van Rooyen et al., 1999;Walsh
et al., 2000)128—but if more accountability promotes fairer outcomes, ethical arguments in
its favour should outweigh minor practical concerns.
5 Conclusion
This paper makes a curious discovery: female-authored articles in top economics journals
are better written. After examining the diﬀerence, I conclude that higher standards applied
by editors and/or referees are primarily to blame.
No prior study has uncovered convincing evidence of gender bias in journal acceptance
rates. It’s encouraging that sex is irrelevant to publication outcomes, but that does not mean
it has no eﬀect on the process—or on the productivity of female academics. When female
authors endure unfair criticism in referee reports, clearer writing and longer review times
follow. With less time to spend on new projects, research output slows down.
Higher standards impose a quantity vs. quality tradeoﬀ that not only reconciles academia’s
“Publishing Paradox”, but also rationalises many instances of female output. Work that is
evaluated more critically at any point in the production process will be systematically better
(holding prices ﬁxed) or systematically cheaper (holding quality ﬁxed). This reduces women’s
wages—for example, if judges require better writing in female-authored briefs, female at-
torneys must charge lower fees and/or under-report hours to compete with men—and dis-
torts measurements of female productivity—billable hours and client revenue decline; female
lawyers appear less productive than they truly are.
My ﬁndings also emphasise the importance of transparency and monitoring. Unlike
referee reports, journal acceptance rates are easy to measure and frequently audited; both
hours as men (Ceci et al., 2014; Ecklund and Lincoln, 2011).
126In an earlier version of this paper, I show that the gender readability gap is actually higher when papers are
evaluated blindly (for results and discussion, see Hengel, 2015, pp. 64–67).
127The BMJ posts reviewers’ signed reports, authors’ responses and the original manuscript on its website. No
documentation is posted for rejected papers, but doing so may be beneﬁcial: (i) A very public review implies
a very public rejection; concern for one’s reputation could reduce the number of low quality submissions. (ii)
The onus of discovering mistakes would be shared with the wider economics community. (iii) Other journals
can make publication decisions based on posted reviews—possibly reducing time spent refereeing for the
discipline, as a whole. Women may receive greater scrutiny online—as they do at the Guardian (Gardiner
et al., 2016)—but the diﬀerence can be mitigated if comments are non-anonymous, made only by veriﬁed
members of an appropriate professional society and continuously (and publicly) audited for bias in quantity
and quality of feedback.
128Each study employed a diﬀerent research design; nevertheless, both estimate roughly 12 percent of reviewers
decline to participate because they oppose open peer review while signing reports increases time spent on the
review by 25 minutes. When referees were told their signed reviews might be posted online, time rose by an
additional half hour and refusal rates were much higher (55 percent) (van Rooyen et al., 2010).
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factors foster accountability, which encourages neutrality (Foschi, 1996). Monitoring referee
reports is diﬃcult but not impossible—especially if peer review were open. Several science
andmedical journals not only reveal referees’ identities, they also post reports online. Quality
does not decline (it may actually increase), referees still referee (even those who initially
refuse) and the extra 25–50 minutes spent reviewing seems tolerable (van Rooyen et al.,
2010; van Rooyen et al., 1999; Walsh et al., 2000).
Finally, the topic of my study is narrow, but its methodology has wider applications.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst (in economics) to identify discrimina-
tion using the choices and behaviours of those discriminated against. Although applied to a
speciﬁc context—peer review—the identifying logic equally suits any situation where peo-
ple repeatedly receive and act on biased feedback. Moreover, this study is also the ﬁrst to
uncover subtle group diﬀerences with readability scores.129 These scores are not new—all
are extensively tested with well-documented properties—but their use is mostly conﬁned to
determining whether text is appropriate for intended audiences.130 As this paper demon-
strates, however, readability scores are also eﬀective tools to evaluate asymmetry anywhere
ideas are communicated orally or in writing and large amounts of source material are easily
obtainable: journalism, speeches, student essays, business plans, Kickstarter campaigns, etc.
Research potential is substantial.
129 Ali et al. (2010) identiﬁed readability scores as useful tools for social scientists. In a large scale analysis of
news content, they found stories on sports (male dominated) and entertainment (female dominated) most
readable. Stempel (1981) reports similar ﬁndings in popular U.S. newspapers.
130 Long andChristensen (2011), Lehavy et al. (2011) andThörnqvist (2015) use readability scores in interesting,
non-conventional ways. The former investigates whether a legal brief ’s Flesch Reading Ease score is correlated
with its success on appeal (it is not); the latter two use readability measures to proxy for complex information
in ﬁnancial reports, ﬁnding less readable material is less informative (Lehavy et al., 2011), especially for non-
sophisticated investors (Thörnqvist, 2015). Since releasing the ﬁrst version of this working paper (September,
2015) research using readability scores has ballooned. See Benoit et al. (2017) for a review of more recent
research.
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Appendices
A Indirect eﬀect of higher standards
Section 3.4.1 implies a tradeoﬀ: address referees’ demands during peer review—but risk desk
rejection—or anticipate them before peer review—and risk wasting time. As a ﬁnal exercise,
I investigate gender diﬀerences in how this tradeoﬀ is made.
Figure A.1 compares papers pre- and post-review at increasing publication counts. Solid
circles denote NBER draft readability; arrow tips reﬂect readability in the ﬁnal, published
versions of those same papers; dashed lines trace readability as papers undergo peer review.
Standard errors from various diﬀerences are shown in Table A.1. Figures are based on FGLS
estimation of Equation (A.14) (see Section 3.3):
Rjitm = β0 + β1 female ratioj + β2 female ratioj × ti + β3 ti + θXj + εj , (A.14)
wherem =W,P for working papers and published articles, respectively, and Xj is a vector
of observable controls: editor, journal, year, journal and year interactions, English ﬂuency
dummies and quality controls—citation count and max. Tj . Since ti is author-speciﬁc, I
disaggregate the data by duplicating each article Nj times; to account for duplicate articles,
regressions are weighted by 1/Nj (see Section 3.2).131
Figure A.1 suggests female economists initially underestimate referees’ expectations:
without experience, their writing improves during peer review;132 with experience, they
write more clearly before peer review. Women’s draft readability increases between t = 1
and t = 2—and then again between t = 2 and t = 3. Consequently, women make fewer
changes during peer review in t = 2 than in t = 1; changes shrink further by t = 3.
Women’s pattern of behaviour both resembles and diﬀers from men’s. Draft and ﬁnal
readability scores for male-authored papers remain relatively constant over increasing t. Un-
like women’s, men’s approach does not radically change with experience: they consistently
overestimate referee demands pre-peer review to minimise changes made in peer review.133
This strategy mirrors women’s at later t. Economists who anticipate demands are desk
rejected less often; economists who don’t enjoy more free time, all things equal.134 Fig-
ure A.1 implies little—if any—gender diﬀerence in this tradeoﬀ. Decisions by junior econ-
omists may reﬂect inexperience, but decisions by senior economists should not. Senior econ-
omists are familiar with peer review; their choices express optimal tradeoﬀs with full infor-
mation (for discussion and justiﬁcation, see Section 3.4.1). Figure A.1 suggests both men
and women sacriﬁce time to increase acceptance rates.
131Results and conclusions based on unweighted regressions—or by replacing ti with max. tj and not dupli-
cating articles—are very similar or identical to those presented here. Regression output from alternative
speciﬁcations available on request (erin.hengel@gmail.com).
132Assuming no gender diﬀerence in acceptance rates at t = 3 and given evidence that women are held to higher
standards documented earlier, Figure A.1 suggests—but does not prove—that manuscripts by junior female
economists are disproportionately rejected.
133Consistent with Table VI, readability may actually decline during peer review. As discussed in Section 3.3,
this may be an artifact speciﬁc to abstracts, which are edited for length in addition to readability. Alter-
natively, writing (too) well upfront satisﬁes the review group with the highest initial readability threshold.
Because referee reports reveal s (and therefore R˜si ), a readability decline after receiving an R&R indicates
that a majority of groups have laxer standards. This explanation is consistent with the theoretical model in
Section 3.4.1.
134Alternatively, if desk rejection rates are gender neutral, authors subject to higher standards will undergo more
arduous peer review. Greater scrutiny would therefore replace higher desk rejection rates when editors (or
even referees) monitor and implement a policy of gender neutral acceptance rates.
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Figure A.: Readability of authors’ tth publication (draft and ﬁnal versions)
Notes. Sample 4,289 observations; 1,988 and 1,986 distinct NBER working papers and published articles, respectively; 1,840
distinct authors. Flesch Reading Ease marginal mean scores for authors’ ﬁrst, second, third, 4th–5th and sixth and up publications
in the data. Solid circles denote estimated readability of NBER working papers from FGLS estimation of Equation (A.14); arrow
tips show the estimated readability in published versions of the same papers. Controls are: editor, year, journal, journal and year
interactions, English ﬂuency dummies and quality controls (citation count and max. Tj ). Regression weighted by 1/Nj . Pink
represents women co-authoring only with other women; blue are men co-authoring only with other men.
The ﬁrst panel of Table A.1 displays the magnitude and standard errors of the contem-
poraneous marginal eﬀect of peer review (RjP −RjW ) for men and women over increasing
t. Figures correspond to the length of the dotted lines in Figure A.1. The diﬀerence in that
length, represented in the third row, approximates the relative tradeoﬀs men and women
make. For publications t = 1 and t = 2, diﬀerences are large and signiﬁcant; in publi-
cations three and up, however, they’re fairly small. Indeed, by publications t = 4–5 and
t = 6+, men and women mostly choose to address referee concerns prior to peer review,
corroborating analysis based on Figure A.1.
Assuming—as other evidence suggests—that men’s and women’s papers are accepted
at identical rates, this unfortunately means senior female economists work harder before
submission to achieve the same outcome post submission.135 The gender gap in readability
scores at t = 6+ is over four points on the Flesch Reading Ease scale (Table A.1). Senior
female economists write approximately ten percent more clearly than men—a ﬁgure which
roughly corresponds to the causal eﬀect of discrimination estimated in Section 3.4.3.
Moreover, male and female economists write equally well at the start of their careers.
There is no gender diﬀerence in draft readability at t = 1. This suggests—although it cannot
conclusively prove—that male and female economists begin their academic careers with the
135The smaller gap at t = 1 may correspond to higher rejection rates for papers authored by junior female
economists. See also Footnote 134 for an alternative interpretation in which acceptance rates are identical
but scrutiny is not.
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Table A.: Readability of authors’ tth publication (draft and ﬁnal versions)
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4–5 t ≥ 6
PredictedRjP −RjW
Women 1.58** 1.16** 0.62 −0.06 −0.52
(0.62) (0.57) (0.65) (0.81) (1.05)
Men −0.28 −0.15 −0.14 −0.27* −0.17
(0.17) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.19)
Diﬀerence 1.86*** 1.31** 0.76 0.21 −0.34
(0.68) (0.63) (0.72) (0.91) (1.14)
Marginal eﬀect of female ratio
Draft paper −0.06 0.99 2.03** 3.07*** 4.11***
(1.24) (0.95) (0.82) (0.89) (1.14)
Published article 1.81 2.30*** 2.79*** 3.28*** 3.77***
(1.19) (0.86) (0.77) (0.99) (1.37)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 33 33 33 33 33
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 4,289 observations; 1,988 and 1,986 distinct NBER working papers and published articles,
respectively; 1,840 distinct authors. Panel one displays magnitude of predictedRjP − RjW (the contempo-
raneous eﬀect of peer review) for women and men over increasing publication count (t). Panel two estimates the
marginal eﬀect of an article’s female ratio (β1 +β2), separately for draft papers and published articles. Figures
from FGLS estimate of Equation (A.14). Quality controls denoted by 33 include citation count, max. Tj and
max. tj . Standard errors clustered by editor and robust to cross-model correlation in parentheses. ***, ** and *
statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
same information about the peer review process. Unfortunately, that information is accurate
only for men.
The second panel of Table A.1 displays the marginal eﬀect of female ratio in draft and
published papers. Draft readability increasingly contributes to the published article gap: less
than zero percent at t = 1, 43 percent at t = 2, 73 percent at t = 3, 94 percent at t = 4–5
and over 100 percent for t = 6+. The total gap, however, remains far more stable—between
2–3 Flesch Reading Ease points. This suggests that female economists are held to relatively
constant—albeit higher—standards throughout their careers.
Figure A.1 supports Theorem 1‘s implicit assumption that female authors learn about
referees’ thresholds over time. If the payoﬀ from lucid exposition is high, people will catch
on—either by internalising explicit comments on text readability in referee reports from
earlier papers or making the (un)conscious connection that acceptance rates are higher—or
review times are faster—when text is clearer. Applying that payoﬀ only to women yields a
succinct explanation for the gap’s observed growth.
Although Table A.1 concurs, the ﬁrst panel viewed in isolation gives a diﬀerent, more
orthodox impression. It suggests that the readability gap declines over increasing t. This nar-
row view favours alternative explanations—e.g., sensitivity, poor information and/or justiﬁed
statistical discrimination—over bias by referees and/or editors. Only when complemented
by Figure A.1 do we fully appreciate that the smaller gap in peer review is completely oﬀset
by a wider gap before peer review.
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This raises a broader concern: responses to discrimination may superﬁcially conceal
it. Female economists adjust to biased treatment in ways that partially—or even totally—
confuse underlying discrimination with voluntary choice. Studies that do not account for
this may underestimate the phenomenon, ﬁnd it does not exist or even conclude bias against
men.
For similar reasons, common performance controls may discount discrimination in equa-
tions that relate wages (and other labour market outcomes) to gender. Controlling for per-
formance is undeniably import; yet just as important is our judgement and measurement of
that performance. Higher standards in narrow dimensions that fail to contribute to the ob-
served value of output will lower superﬁcial measures of female productivity and confound
gender diﬀerences in labour market outcomes.
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B Proofs
The proof ofTheorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 5, at the end of this section. The proof
of Lemma 5 relies on a series of additional lemmas stated and proved below. Throughout,
{(r0it, Rit)} represents the sequence of readability choices made by author i for all t. R⋆i is
deﬁned as the R that solves φ′i(R) = c
′
i(R). Review group s is referred to as “state s”.
Lemma 1. {(r0it, Rit)} is bounded.
Proof. Consider the sequence of initial readability choices, {r0it}. I ﬁrst show thatR⋆i ≤ r0it
for all t. Recall r0it is chosen to maximise the author’s subjective expected utility in Equa-
tion (9). It satisﬁes the following ﬁrst order condition∫
Σ
(
pis0it(r0it)v
s
1it +Π
s
0it(r0it)
∂vs1it
∂r0it
)
dµi + φ
′
i(r0it)− c′i(r0it) = 0, (B.15)
where vs1it represents Equation (9) evaluated at the optimal r1it. φi|r0it(r1it) = φi(Rit) −
φi(r1it) and ci|r0it(r1it) = ci(Rit)− ci(r0it). Thus,
∂vs1it
∂r0it
= pis1it(Rit)ui + φ
′
i(Rit)− c′i(Rit)− φ′i(r0it) + c′i(r0it)
=
∂vs1it
∂r1it
+ c′i(r0it)− φ′i(r0it). (B.16)
Since φ′i(R
⋆
i ) = c
′
i(R
⋆
i ), ∂v
s
1it/∂r0it = ∂v
s
1it/∂r1it when evaluated at r0it = R
⋆
i . The
left hand side of Equation (B.15) evaluated at r0it = R⋆i is correspondingly equivalent to∫
Σ
(
pis0it(r0it)v
s
1it +Π
s
0it(r0it)
∂vs1it
∂r1it
)
dµi. (B.17)
vs1it is non-negative;
136 optimising behaviour at stage 1 implies ∂vs1it/∂r1it ≥ 0: either an
r1it exists that satisﬁes ∂vs1it/∂r1it = 0, or the author chooses r1it = 0 and ∂v
s
1it/∂r1it =
pis1it(Rit)ui is non-negative. Thus, Equation (B.17) is non-negative. Since c
′
i(r) < φ
′
i(r)
for all r < R⋆i , the left-hand side of Equation (B.15) is strictly positive for all r < R
⋆
i , so
r0it must be at least as large as R⋆i .
I now show that {r0it} is bounded from above. As r0 tends to inﬁnity, authors choose
not to make any changes at stage 1. Thus,
lim
r0→∞
Πs0it(r0)v
s
1it = Π
s
0itΠ
s
1itui, (B.18)
whereΠ
s
0it andΠ
s
1it are some upper bounds on the author’s subjective probability of receiving
an R&R and then being accepted in state s at time t. Since both are no more than 1, ui is
ﬁnite and φi(r)− ci(r) is strictly decreasing for all r > R⋆i ,
lim
r0→∞
{∫
Σ
Πs0it(r0)v
s
1it dµi + φi(r0)− ci(r0)
}
= −∞. (B.19)
136Equation (8) evaluated at r1it = 0 is non-negative. Since r1it maximises Equation (8), vs1it is likewise
non-negative.
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Similarly, because Πs0it(r0it)Π
s
1it(Rit) ≤ 1 for all s and φi(r) and ci(r) are ﬁnite at all
r <∞, Equation (9) is likewise ﬁnite for all r <∞. Thus,
sup
{
argmax
r0it
∫
Σ
Πs0it(r0it)v
s
1it dµi + φi(r0it)− ci(r0it)
}
<∞, (B.20)
so {r0it} is bounded.
It remains to show that {Rit} is likewise bounded. Since r1it ≥ 0 andRit = r0it+ r1it,
Rit is bounded below by r0it, which, as just shown, is itself bounded. Additionally, the
author opts for r1it = 0 if Equation (8) is less than 0 for all r1it > 0. Since R⋆i ≤ r0it and
Πs1it(Rit) ≤ 1
Πs1it(Rit)ui + φi(Rit)− φi(r0it)− ci(Rit) + ci(r0it)
≤ ui + φi(Rit)− ci(Rit) (B.21)
Equation (B.22) is strictly decreasing in R for all R ≥ R⋆i . The author will not choose any
R strictly greater than the one that equates Equation (B.22) to 0. Thus, {Rit} is bounded
from above.
Because {r0it} and {Rit} are bounded, the sequence {(r0it, Rit)} in R2 is likewise
bounded. Thus, all is proved.
Lemma 2. r0i ≤ r0it and Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′.
Proof. Bounded inﬁnite sequences have at least one cluster point and at least one subse-
quence that converges to each cluster point (Bolzano-Weierstrass). Let {(r0it, Rq
⋆
it )} denote
the complete subsequence of {(r0it, Rit)} in which state q is reached. Thus,{(
r0it, R
s⋆
it
)} ⋂
s⋆ ̸=q⋆
{(
r0it, R
q⋆
it
)}
= ∅ and
⋃
q⋆∈Σ
{(
r0it, R
q⋆
it
)}
= {(r0it, Rit)} .
Fix state s. Because Σ is ﬁnite, {(r0it, Rs⋆it )} likewise forms a bounded inﬁnite sequence
and therefore converges to at least one cluster point. Fix one such cluster point, (r0i, Rsi ),
and let {(r0it, Rsit)} denote the subsequence of {(r0it, Rs
⋆
it )} that converges to it.
Consider ﬁrst the proposition that Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′. By way of a contradiction,
assume Rsit < R
s
i for all t > t
′′ and some ﬁxed rs0it. Thus, r
s
1it < r
s
1it+1 for all t > t
′′. A
positive rs1it implies that R
s
it satisﬁes
pis1it(R
s
it) =
1
ui
(
c′i(R
s
it)− φ′i(Rsit)
)
. (B.22)
Let pis1i denote the terminal value of pi
s
1it as t tends to∞. pis1i is ﬁnite; thus, {pis1it} itself
converges: if R˜si < R
s
i , then pi
s
1it(R
s
it) = 0 for all t > t
′′, where t′′ has been redeﬁned
to assure R˜si ≤ Rsit; if Rsi ≤ R˜si and pis1i(Rsi ) = ∞, then pis1i(R) = 0 for all R > Rsi , a
violation of Assumption X.
Convergence by {pis1it} and {Rsit} means
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣pis1it+1(Rsit+1)− pisit(Rsit)∣∣∣ = 0.
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Yet Equation (B.22) implies
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣pis1it+1(Rsit+1)− pisit(Rsit)∣∣∣
= lim
ε→0
1
ui
( [
c′i(R
s
it + ε)− c′i(Rsit)
]− [φ′i(Rsit + ε)− φ′i(Rsit)] )
=
1
ui
(
c′′i (R
s
i )− φ′′i (Rsi )
)
, (B.23)
where Rsit → Rsi guarantees that for all (suﬃciently small) ε > 0 there exists Rsit+1 =
Rsit+ ε. ui > 0, c
′′
i (R) > 0 and φ
′′
i (R) < 0 by assumption; thus, Equation (B.23) is strictly
positive. According to Equation (B.23), {pis1it} does not converge, a contradiction.
Consider now the proposition that r0i ≤ r0it for all t past some t′′. As before, I proceed
with a contradiction. Suppose r0it < r0i for all t > t′, where t′ is large enough that
r˜q0i ̸∈ (r0it′ , r0i) for all q ̸= s and rs1it+1 ≤ rs1it for all s ∈ Σ.
At time t, the author chooses r0it. This choice is governed by the ﬁrst-order condition
in Equation (B.15):
K + µsi
(
pis0it(r0it)v
s
1it +Π
s
0it(r0it)
∂vs1it
∂r0it
)
= c′i(r0it)− φ′i(r0it) (B.24)
where µsi is the probability of drawing state s and
K =
∫
Σ\s
(
piq0it(r0it)v
q
1it +Π
q
0it(r0it)
∂vq1it
∂r0it
)
dµi
is the marginal change in expected stage 1 subjective utility in all states q ̸= s.
If rs1it+1 > 0 then r
s
1it > 0. Thus ∂v
s
1it/∂r1it = 0; from Equation (B.16), Equa-
tion (B.24) is equivalent to
K + µsipi
s
0it(r0it)v
s
1it =
(
1− µsiΠs0it(r0it)
)(
c′i(r0it)− φ′i(r0it)
)
. (B.25)
If rs1it = 0 then r
s
1it+1 = 0, and ∂v
s
1it/∂r1it = pi
s
1it(R
s
it)ui.
137 In this case, Equation (B.24)
is equivalent to
K + µsi
(
pis0it(r0it)v
s
1it +Π
s
0it(r0it)pi
s
1it(R
s
it)ui
)
= c′i(r0it)− φ′i(r0it). (B.26)
By the monotone convergence theorem, {vs1it} and {Πs0it} converge.138 If r˜s0i < r0i,
then pis0it(r0it) = 0 for all t > t
′, where t′ has been redeﬁned to assure r˜s0i ≤ r0it; if
r0i ≤ r˜s0i, then
lim
t→∞ Π
s
0it(r0it) = lim
t→∞
∑
r∈Ωt
pis0it(r) = pi
s
0i(r0i), (B.27)
where Ωt = (r0it−1, r0it]. pis0i(r0i) = ∞ implies limΠs0it = ∞, which is impossible given
Πs0it, by deﬁnition, is a bounded function. Hence, {pis0it} is likewise convergent, so
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣µsi (pis0it+1(r0it+1)vs1it+1 − pis0it(r0it)vs1it) ∣∣∣
= µsi
(
lim
t→∞pi
s
0it+1(r0it+1) lim
t→∞ v
s
1it+1 − lim
t→∞pi
s
0it(r0it) lim
t→∞ v
s
1it
)
= 0
137If rs1it > 0 and r
s
1it+1 = 0, redeﬁne t
′ as t′ + 1. rs1it+1 ≤ rs1it+1 for all t > t′ precludes rs1it = 0 and
rs1it+1 > 0.
138∂vs1it/∂r0it ≥ 0 and vs1it is bounded below by zero and above by ui + max{φi(R⋆i ) − ci(R⋆i ), 0}.
pis0it(r0it) ≥ 0 since r0it < r0it+1 (by assumption) and Πs0it is bounded by 0 and 1 (by deﬁnition).
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and
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣µsiui (Πs0it+1(r0it+1)pis1it+1(Rsit+1)−Πs0it(r0it)pis1it(Rsit)) ∣∣∣
= µsi ui
(
lim
t→∞ Π
s
0it+1(r0it+1) lim
t→∞ pi
s
1it+1(R
s
it+1)− lim
t→∞ Π
s
0it(r0it) lim
t→∞ pi
s
1it(R
s
it)
)
= 0.
For themoment, assume there exists t′′ such that for all r ∈ (r0it′′ , r0i),K is constant.139
Thus, changes over time to the left-hand sides of Equation (B.25) and Equation (B.26)
converge to 0. Yet the right-hand sides of Equation (B.25) and Equation (B.26) do not,
since
lim
t→∞ µ
s
iΠ
s
0it(r0it) = µ
s
iΠ
s
0i(r0i)
is strictly less than 1, where Πs0i is the ﬁnite limit of {Πs0it}, while
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣ (c′i(r0it+1)− c′i(r0it))− (φ′i(r0it+1)− φ′i(r0it)) ∣∣∣
= lim
ε→0
(
c′i(r0it + ε)− c′i(r0it)
)− (φ′i(r0it + ε)− φ′i(r0it))
= c′′i (r0i)− φ′′i (r0i)
is strictly greater than 0, where convergence of {r0it} guarantees that for all (suﬃciently
small) ε > 0 there exists r0it+1 = r0it + ε.140 Thus, a contradiction.
Although the contradiction depends on the existence of t′′, the ﬁnite sum of convergent
sequences is also convergent. Thus, for any ﬁnite number of states in which piq0it ̸= 0 changes
to the left-hand sides of Equation (B.25) and Equation (B.26) converge to 0 while changes
to their right-hand sides do not. Because the number of states is ﬁnite by assumption, this
establishes the general contradiction.
Lemma 3. Πs0it(r0it)→ 1s0i(r0i) and Πs1it(Rsit)→ 1s1i(Rsi ).
Proof. As established in Lemma 2, Rsi ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′. If Rsi < R˜si then Rsit < R˜si
for all t > t′′ where t′′ has been redeﬁned to satisfy the latter inequality. Thus, the paper is
rejected for all t > t′′ and Πs1it(R) = 0 for all R ≤ Rsit′′ and t > t′′. If R˜si ≤ Rsi , then
R˜si ≤ Rsit for all t > t′′ (again t′′ redeﬁned to satisfy this inequality). Thus, the paper is
accepted for all t > t′′. Πs1it+1(R) = 1 for all R ≥ Rsit and t > t′′; Πs1it(Rsit) converges to
1 at the limit.
Also from Lemma 2, r0i ≤ r0it for all t > t′. If r0i < r˜s0i, then the paper is rejected at
stage 0 for all t > t′, where t′ is deﬁned so that r0it < r˜s0i for all t > t
′. Deﬁne t′′ > t′ such
that for all t > t′′, the probability of having reached state s is 1; thus, Πsit(r0it) = 0 for all
t > t′′. If r˜s0i ≤ r0i, then redeﬁne t′′ so that r˜s0i ≤ r0it for all t > t′′. The paper is accepted,
s is revealed and Πs0it+1(r) = 1 for all r ≥ r0it and t > t′′; Πs0it(r0i) converges to 1 at the
limit. Thus, all is proved.
139Eﬀectively, this assumes piq0it(r) = 0 for all r ∈ (r0it′′ , r0i) and q ̸= s and (i) Πq0it(r) = 0 for all q in which
r0i < r˜
q
0i; (ii) Π
q
0it(r) = 1 and pi
q
1it(R
q
it) = 0 for all q in which r˜
q
0i < r0i; and (iii) r˜
q
0i ̸= r0i for any q.
Collectively, these assumptions imply convergence of {piq0it}, {Rqit} and {piq1it} in every state q ̸= s and no
change to the author’s marginal stage 1 objective function given a small increase in r in any state but s.
140Although the change in 1− µsiΠs0it(r0it) between time t and t+ 1 converges to 0, it cannot converge faster
than c′i(r0it)− φ′i(r0it) unless pis0it(r0i) =∞, which Equation (B.27) shows is not possible.
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Lemma 4. There exists a unique cluster point of {(r0it, Rs⋆it )} for every s⋆ ∈ Σ.
Proof. Suppose {(r0it, Rs⋆it )} has two cluster points: (r′0i, Rs′i ) and (r′′0i, Rs′′i ). Denote their
respective convergent subsequences by {(r′0it, Rs′it)} and {(r′′0it, Rs′′it )}. Given the concav-
ity of φi and convexity of ci, a unique readability at each stage maximises Equation (8)
and Equation (9) for ﬁxed Πs0it and Π
s
1it. Thus, r
′
0i0 = r
′′
0i0 and R
s′
i0 = R
s′′
i0 at time 0.
Assume at time t the author has chosen r′0il = r
′′
0il and R
s′
il = R
s′′
il for all l < t; thus,
Πs′0it(r) = Π
s′′
0it(r) andΠ
s′
1it(R) = Π
s′′
1it(R) for all r andR, so the author chooses r
′
0it = r
′′
0it
and Rs′it = R
s′′
it at time t as well. By the axiom of induction, {(r′0it, Rs′it)} = {(r′′0it, Rs′′it )}
for all t so (r0i, Rsi ) is unique.
141 Since the choice of s was arbitrary exists a unique cluster
point of {(r0it, Rs⋆it )} for every s⋆ ∈ Σ.
Lemma 5. Consider two equivalent authors, i and k, such that
1. for at least one t′′ < t′, (r0it′′ , Rit′′) < (r0it′ , Rit′) and there existsK ′′ > 0 such that for
no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0it′′ , Rit′′)|| < K ′′; and
2. (r0kt, Rkt) ≤ (r0it, Rit) for all s ∈ ΣAit and t > t′ and there exists K ′ > 0 such that
for at least one s ∈ ΣAit and no t > t′, ||(r0it, Rit)− (r0kt, Rkt)|| < K ′.
If r˜s0i = r˜
s
0k, R˜
s
i = R˜
s
k and µ
s
i = µ
s
k for all s ∈ Σ, then∫
Σ
1s0k(r0kt)1
s
1k(Rkt) dµk <
∫
Σ
1s0i(r0it)1
s
1it(Rit) dµi. (B.28)
Proof. Suppose for the moment that ΣAit contains only state q and assume r0kt = r0it.
Since q is the only state in ΣAit , R
q
kt < R
q
it. As a result,
1s0k(r0kt)1
s
1k(R
s
kt) = 1
s
0i(r0it)1
s
1i(R
s
it) = 0 for all s ̸= q,
and
1s0k(r0kt)1
s
1k(R
s
kt) ≤ 1s0i(r0it)1s1i(Rsit) = 1 for s = q. (B.29)
If I show that the inequality in Equation (B.29) is strict, then Equation (B.31) is true. By way
of a contradiction, assume it holds as an equality. Thus, R˜qi ≤ Rqk < Rqi , where Rqkt → Rqk
and Rqit → Rqi (Lemma 4). Together with R⋆i ≤ r0it′′ < Rqi , this implies
lim
ε→0−
Πq1i(R
q
i + ε) < 1.
142 (B.30)
Meanwhile, author i observes author k’s prior readability choices, publication history
and paper count. From this, he discovers
lim
Nk→∞
NAk
Nk
= µqi , (B.31)
141Note that r0it is chosen before s is realised, meaning r0i is the unique cluster point of {r0it} regardless of s.
142That is, Πq0i(R) = 1 for all R ≥ Rqi . Because he chose R⋆i ≤ Rit′′ < Rqi at some earlier date, the author’s
marginal beneﬁt from a higher R is decreasing when the probability of acceptance remains constant. Thus,
if he optimally chooses Rqi > max{Rit′′ , Rqk}, it must be because there is no smaller R that satisﬁes Equa-
tion (B.22). This is only possible if there is a jump discontinuity inΠq0i atR
q
i , as illustrated in Equation (B.30).
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where NAk and Nk are author k’s accepted and total paper counts, respectively. Because
i updates Πs1it when he observes with probability 1 that in state s, k is accepted at some
R ̸= Rsi (see Footnote 69), Equation (B.31) necessarily implies
lim
ε→0−
Πs1i(R
s
i + ε) = 1,
a contradiction.
Similar proofs by contradiction show that the inequality in Equation (B.29) must also
be strict when Rqkt = R
q
it and r0kt < r0it in state q and when ΣAit contains more than one
state.
Proof of Corollary 1. I ﬁrst show that Equation (11) conservatively estimatesDik whenΣAit ⊂
ΣAkt . Let r0it < Rit. From Equation (10) and the deﬁnition of δ
s
1ik,
Rit −Rkt = R˜si + e1it −max
{
R⋆k, r˜
sk
0k + e0kt, R˜
s
k + e1kt
}
≤ R˜si − R˜sk + e1it − e1kt
= δs1ik + e1it − e1kt. (B.32)
where sk is the review group in ΣAkt for which r˜
s
0k is highest. When Rit = r0it, how-
ever, Equation (10) and the deﬁnition of δs0ik instead imply:
Rit −Rkt = max
{
R⋆i , r˜
si
0i + e0it
}
−max
{
R⋆k, r˜
sk
0k + e0kt, R˜
s
k + e1kt
}
≤ max
{
R⋆i , r˜
si
0i + e0it
}
− r˜sk0k − e0kt, (B.33)
where si is the review group in ΣAit for which r˜
s
0i is highest. From Theorem 1’s second
condition, Rit′′ < Rit for some t′′ < t. Thus, Rit′′ < r0it. Because R⋆i is a lower bound on
r0it for all s and t (Lemma 1), R⋆i < r0it; Equation (B.33) is equivalent to
Rit −Rkt ≤ r˜si0i − r˜sk0k + e0it − e0kt
= δsi0ik + r˜
si
0k − r˜sk0k + e0it − e0kt. (B.34)
e0it = e0kt and e1it = e1kt (by assumption). Because ΣAit ⊂ ΣAkt , r˜si0k ≤ r˜sk0k (by deﬁni-
tion); Equation (B.34) impliesRit−Rkt ≤ δsi0ik if Rit = r0it. Meanwhile, Equation (B.32)
implies Rit −Rkt ≤ δs1ik if r0it < Rit.
It remains to show that Equation (12) conservatively estimates Dik under Theorem 1’s
weaker Condition 3. Let Rit′′ ≤ Rkt. Diﬀerences in i and k’s preferences might inﬂuence
readability—but only up to Rit′′ . Rit′′ < Rit is motivated by i’s desire to increase his accep-
tance rate. Since i’s unconditional acceptance rate is identical to k’s, any s′ in ΣAit but not
inΣAkt—e.g., because i’s utility of acceptance is higher or cost of writing lower—is perfectly
oﬀset by some other s′′ such that—because s′′ discriminates against i—s′′ is inΣAkt but not
in ΣAit . Thus, Rit −Rkt remains a conservative estimate Dik.
Now let Rkt < Rit′′ . Since i’s unconditional acceptance rate at Rit is identical to k’s at
Rkt, k’s acceptance rate atRit′′ must be at least as high as i’s atRit. Without loss of general-
ity, assume they are identical. Preferences are time independent, so holding acceptance rates
constant, i prefers Rit′′ to Rit. A time t choice of Rit over Rit′′ reveals a higher probability
of acceptance for the former—and a necessarily lower probability of acceptance for i than k
at Rit′′ . Given i and k are equivalent, this diﬀerence is due to δ
si
0ik or δ
s
1ik. Rit − Rit′′ is a
conservative estimate of Rik. Thus, all is proved.
52
C Average ﬁrst, mean and ﬁnal paper scores
Table C.2 displays authors’ average readability scores for their ﬁrst, mean and ﬁnal papers.
Grade-level scores (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOGandDale-Chall) have beenmul-
tiplied by negative one (see Section 2.1). Sample excludes authors with fewer than three
publications.
Table C.: Average ﬁrst, mean and ﬁnal paper scores
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
Average ﬁrst paper score
Women 39.20 −13.81 −17.36 −15.18 −11.00
(1.152) (0.238) (0.289) (0.210) (0.097)
Men 39.37 −13.77 −17.54 −15.35 −11.00
(0.307) (0.072) (0.082) (0.055) (0.026)
Average mean score
Women 41.20 −13.36 −16.92 −14.92 −10.91
(0.720) (0.147) (0.185) (0.135) (0.067)
Men 39.59 −13.69 −17.42 −15.27 −11.02
(0.186) (0.043) (0.048) (0.033) (0.016)
Average ﬁnal paper score
Women 41.99 −13.10 −16.58 −14.66 −10.90
(1.060) (0.215) (0.253) (0.182) (0.107)
Men 39.53 −13.71 −17.41 −15.24 −11.08
(0.325) (0.080) (0.090) (0.059) (0.026)
Notes. Sample 1,674 authors; includes only authors with three or more publications. Figures are average
readability scores for authors’ ﬁrst, mean and last published articles. Grade-level scores have been multiplied by
negative one (see Section 2.1). Standard errors in parentheses.
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D Supplemental output
D.1 Table IV, journal and male eﬀects. Table D.3 shows male eﬀects from the regres-
sions described and presented in Table IV. Eﬀects estimated at a female ratio of zero and
observed values for other co-variates. Grade-level eﬀects (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog,
SMOG and Dale-Chall) have been multiplied by negative one (Section 2.1). Table D.3
shows the coeﬃcients on the journal dummies in column (2), Table IV. They compare
AER’s readability to the readability of Econometrica, JPE and QJE.
Table D.: Table IV, male eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Flesch Reading Ease 39.59 39.59 39.60 39.60 39.58 40.13 40.29
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.058) (0.086)
Flesch-Kincaid −13.72 −13.72 −13.72 −13.72 −13.73 −13.48 −13.46
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017)
Gunning Fog −17.46 −17.46 −17.46 −17.46 −17.47 −17.16 −17.12
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020)
SMOG −15.28 −15.28 −15.28 −15.28 −15.28 −15.10 −15.07
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Dale-Chall −11.00 −11.00 −11.00 −11.00 −11.00 −11.03 −11.03
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3¹ 3¹ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3
JEL (primary) eﬀects 3
JEL (tertiary) eﬀects 3
Notes. 9,122 articles in (1)–(5); 5,216 articles in (6); 5,777 articles—including 561 from AER Papers & Proceedings (see Footnote 46)—in
(7). Figures correspond to the male eﬀects from regression results presented in Table IV. Eﬀects estimated at a female ratio of zero and
observed values for other co-variates. Quality controls denoted by 31 include citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors
clustered on editor in parentheses.
Table D.: Journal readability, comparisons to AER
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
Econometrica −12.48*** −4.44*** −4.26*** −2.63*** −0.66***
(1.93) (0.41) (0.47) (0.38) (0.16)
JPE −5.69*** −4.01*** −3.42*** −1.84*** 0.18
(1.93) (0.41) (0.47) (0.38) (0.16)
QJE 1.47** −0.04 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.27***
(0.63) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
Notes. Figures are the estimated coeﬃcients on the journal dummy variables from (2) in Table IV.
Each contrasts the readability of the journals in the left-hand column with the readability of AER.
Standard errors clustered on editor in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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D.2 Table V, male eﬀects. Table D.5 displays total male eﬀects—i.e., the total eﬀect for
men co-authoring only with other men—from the regressions presented in Table V. Eﬀects
estimated at a female ratio of zero and observed values for other co-variates. Grade-level
eﬀects (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and Dale-Chall) have been multiplied by
negative one (see Section 2.1).
Table D.: Table V, male eﬀects
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
Male eﬀect 39.79 −13.63 −17.37 −15.23 −11.01
(0.146) (0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.012)
Nj 3 3 3 3 3
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3¹ 3¹ 3¹ 3¹ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 9,186 observations (2,827 authors). Figures correspond to themale eﬀects from regression results presented
in Table V (ﬁrst-diﬀerenced, IV estimation of Equation (1), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)).
Eﬀects estimated at a female ratio of zero and observed values for other co-variates. Quality controls denoted by 31
include citation count and max. Tj ﬁxed eﬀects. Regressions weighted by 1/Nj ; standard errors adjusted for two-way
clustering on editor and author (in parentheses).
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D.3 TableVII (ﬁrst column), full output. Table D.6 estimates Equation (2) via OLS.The
ﬁrst row displays coeﬃcients on the working paper score, RjW . The second row is the coef-
ﬁcient on female ratio (β1P ), also shown in the ﬁrst column of Table VII. Remaining rows
present estimated coeﬃcients from the other (non-ﬁxed eﬀects) control variables: Max. tj
and Max. Tj—contemporaneous and lifetime publication counts for article j ’s most proliﬁc
co-author, respectively—number of citations and a dummy variable equal to one if article j
is authored by at least one native (or almost native) English speaker.
Table D.: Table VII (ﬁrst column), full output
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
RjW 0.833*** 0.755*** 0.773*** 0.790*** 0.841***
(0.022) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.016)
Female ratio 1.329** 0.518*** 0.517*** 0.304** 0.179***
(0.580) (0.177) (0.188) (0.129) (0.054)
Max. tj 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 −0.004
(0.072) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.004)
Max. Tj 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.054) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.003)
No. citations −0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Native speaker −0.306 0.009 0.023 0.012 −0.057*
(0.378) (0.149) (0.176) (0.104) (0.031)
Constant 16.969*** −2.179*** −2.307*** −2.170*** −0.613***
(0.971) (0.609) (0.683) (0.476) (0.212)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year×Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 1,801 NBER working papers; 1,799 published articles. Estimates exclude 279 pre-internet
double-blind reviewed articles (see Footnote 61). Coeﬃcients from OLS regression of Equation (2). First
row is the coeﬃcient on RjW ; second row is β1P , and corresponds to results presented in the ﬁrst column
of Table VII. Coeﬃcients on quality controls (citation counts, max. Tj and max. tj ) also shown. Standard
errors clustered on editor (in parentheses). ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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D.4 Table VIII, equality test statistics andmale eﬀects. Table D.7 displays χ2 test statis-
tics from Wald tests of β1 (Equation (1)) equality across estimation results in Table VIII.
Table D.8 shows male eﬀects from the regressions described and presented in Table VIII.
Eﬀects estimated at a female ratio of zero and observed values for other co-variates. Grade-
level eﬀects (Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and Dale-Chall) have been multiplied
by negative one (Section 2.1).
Table D.: Table VIII, equality test statistics
t = 1 vs. 2 t = 1 vs. 3t = 1 vs. 4–5t = 1 vs. ≥ 6t = 2 vs. 3
Flesch Reading Ease 1.708 12.213 1.505 2.028 5.000
Flesch-Kincaid 0.237 8.470 1.254 1.282 5.080
Gunning Fog 0.537 7.860 1.348 1.397 4.385
SMOG 0.872 7.782 1.664 2.060 3.777
Dale-Chall 0.089 4.169 1.688 2.013 2.669
Notes. χ2 test statistics from Wald tests of β1 (Equation (1)) equality across estimation results in Table VIII.
Table D.: Table VIII, male eﬀects
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4–5 t ≥ 6 All
Flesch Reading Ease 39.58 39.55 39.63 39.57 39.82 39.71
(0.060) (0.106) (0.146) (0.153) (0.201) (0.149)
Flesch-Kincaid −13.71 −13.69 −13.65 −13.63 −13.58 −13.65
(0.012) (0.022) (0.030) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035)
Gunning Fog −17.43 −17.40 −17.36 −17.35 −17.28 −17.38
(0.015) (0.027) (0.036) (0.040) (0.051) (0.038)
SMOG −15.25 −15.24 −15.23 −15.23 −15.18 −15.24
(0.011) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) (0.026)
Dale-Chall −11.02 −11.03 −11.03 −11.05 −11.03 −11.01
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
No. observations 6,876 2,827 1,674 1,908 2,777 12,013
Nj 3 3 3 3 3 3
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Journal×Year eﬀects 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Quality controls 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3⁵ 3¹
Native speaker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Figures correspond to themale eﬀects from regression results presented in Table VIII (FGLS estimation of Equation (1)
without lagged dependent variable). First column restricts sample to authors’ ﬁrst publication in the data (t = 1), second
column to their second (t = 2), etc. Regressions weighted by 1/Nj (see Section 3.2). Standard errors (in parentheses)
adjusted for two-way clustering (editor and author) and cross-model correlation. Final column estimates from an unweighted
population-averaged regression; error correlations speciﬁed by an auto-regressive process of order one and standard errors (in
parentheses) adjusted for one-way clustering on author. Quality controls denoted by 31 include citation count and max. Tj
ﬁxed eﬀects; 35 includes citation count, only. ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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D.5 Section 3.4.3, co-variate balance. Table D.9 compares co-variate balance pre- and
post-match. The ﬁrst column displays averages for the 121 female authors with at least three
publications in the data. The ﬁrst column of the ﬁrst panel (“Pre-match means”) displays
corresponding averages for the 1,553 male authors with three or more publications. The
ﬁrst column of the second panel (“Post-match means”) displays (weighted) averages for the
104 male authors matched with a female author. Table D.10, Table D.11 and Table D.12
compare co-variate balance when restricted to matched pairs with Dik ̸= 0.
Gender diﬀerences are smaller post-match; t-statistics are likewise closer to zero. More-
over, co-variates remain well balanced between Dik > 0 (discrimination against women)
and Dik < 0 (discrimination against men) samples; both resemble averages in the matched
sample.
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Table D.: Pre- and post-matching summary statistics
Pre-match means Post-match means
Women Men Diﬀerence t Men Diﬀerence t
T 4.55 5.90 −1.35 −3.47 4.65 −0.11 −0.32
Avg. Nit 2.20 2.09 0.11 1.99 2.29 −0.09 −1.06
Min. order in issue 2.69 2.43 0.26 1.50 2.88 −0.18 −0.67
% ﬁrst authored by i 1.83 3.34 −1.51 −1.58 3.44 −1.61 −1.43
Max. citations 267.07 406.62 −139.56 −1.78 278.75 −11.68 −0.20
Max. inst. rank 49.26 44.42 4.83 2.72 47.71 1.54 0.74
Avg. year 2003.48 1995.45 8.03 6.89 2002.15 1.33 1.17
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −1.57 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.04 −0.04 −2.87 0.01 −0.01 −0.88
1970–79 0.01 0.11 −0.09 −4.72 0.02 0.00 −0.27
1980–89 0.08 0.18 −0.10 −4.36 0.12 −0.04 −1.43
1990–99 0.19 0.21 −0.02 −0.99 0.17 0.02 0.52
2000–09 0.41 0.26 0.15 5.90 0.39 0.02 0.51
2010–15 0.31 0.20 0.11 4.19 0.30 0.01 0.32
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.39 0.25 0.14 5.52 0.36 0.02 0.57
Econometrica 0.17 0.34 −0.17 −5.12 0.17 0.00 −0.03
JPE 0.18 0.24 −0.07 −2.62 0.19 −0.01 −0.36
QJE 0.27 0.17 0.10 4.78 0.28 −0.01 −0.25
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.04 0.02 0.02 1.58 0.02 0.02 0.95
B Methodology 0.00 0.02 −0.02 −1.44 0.02 −0.02 −1.53
C Quant. methods 0.64 0.81 −0.17 −1.03 0.52 0.13 0.78
D Microeconomics 1.64 1.79 −0.15 −0.69 1.54 0.10 0.43
E Macroeconomics 0.58 0.62 −0.05 −0.37 0.39 0.18 1.42
F International 0.39 0.31 0.08 0.81 0.28 0.11 0.90
G Finance 0.60 0.52 0.07 0.68 0.42 0.17 1.14
H Public 0.45 0.36 0.10 1.09 0.59 −0.13 −1.01
I Health, welfare, edu 0.88 0.34 0.53 5.35 0.90 −0.03 −0.13
J Labour 1.26 0.76 0.49 3.39 1.47 −0.21 −0.89
K Law and econ 0.20 0.14 0.06 1.14 0.29 −0.09 −1.12
L Industrial org 0.73 0.57 0.16 1.46 0.63 0.09 0.63
MMarketing/accounting 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.92 0.19 −0.03 −0.33
N Economic history 0.29 0.14 0.15 2.73 0.26 0.03 0.28
O Development 0.86 0.52 0.34 2.58 0.93 −0.07 −0.34
P Economic systems 0.08 0.09 −0.01 −0.22 0.09 0.00 −0.08
Q Agri., environment 0.18 0.12 0.06 1.20 0.22 −0.04 −0.50
R Regional, transport 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.21 −0.04 −0.70
Z Special topics 0.16 0.10 0.06 1.50 0.29 −0.13 −1.74
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. First panel shows pre-match summary statistics (121 female authors, 1,553
male authors). Second panel shows post-match summary statistics (104 male authors). t-values for diﬀerences reported in columns four and
seven.
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Table D.: Co-variate post-match balance when Dik ̸= 0
Flesch Reading Ease Flesch Kincaid
Discrimination Discrimination
Against
women
Against
men Diﬀerence t
Against
women
Against
men Diﬀerence t
T 4.92 4.61 0.32 0.66 4.85 4.71 0.14 0.30
Avg. Nit 2.24 2.29 −0.05 −0.48 2.21 2.28 −0.07 −0.78
Min. order in issue 2.70 2.61 0.09 0.26 2.94 2.38 0.56 1.78
% ﬁrst authored by i 3.63 2.10 1.53 1.09 2.34 3.80 −1.46 −1.03
Max. citations 294.41 309.42 −15.01 −0.20 215.62 342.51 −126.90 −1.90
Max. inst. rank 47.96 47.43 0.53 0.20 47.52 49.86 −2.34 −1.00
Avg. year 2002.03 2003.75 −1.72 −1.29 2001.99 2003.75 −1.77 −1.35
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −1.00 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.90
1970–79 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.08 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.55
1980–89 0.14 0.07 0.07 1.77 0.12 0.05 0.07 2.07
1990–99 0.18 0.18 0.00 −0.10 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.54
2000–09 0.41 0.38 0.03 0.67 0.42 0.41 0.01 0.14
2010–15 0.26 0.35 −0.09 −1.78 0.26 0.33 −0.08 −1.69
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.35 0.42 −0.07 −1.56 0.36 0.41 −0.05 −1.07
Econometrica 0.14 0.15 −0.01 −0.15 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.33
JPE 0.22 0.16 0.05 1.35 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.82
QJE 0.29 0.27 0.02 0.55 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.05
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.03 0.04 −0.01 −0.45 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.45
B Methodology 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.42 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
C Quant. methods 0.51 0.48 0.03 0.15 0.62 0.51 0.10 0.64
D Microeconomics 1.61 1.70 −0.09 −0.32 1.63 1.69 −0.06 −0.23
E Macroeconomics 0.48 0.51 −0.03 −0.16 0.45 0.49 −0.03 −0.24
F International 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.30 −0.05 −0.36
G Finance 0.53 0.54 −0.01 −0.06 0.37 0.67 −0.30 −1.67
H Public 0.63 0.51 0.13 0.74 0.57 0.55 0.02 0.14
I Health, welfare, edu 1.09 0.92 0.16 0.54 1.15 1.02 0.13 0.41
J Labour 1.57 1.33 0.24 0.78 1.53 1.56 −0.02 −0.08
K Law and econ 0.28 0.30 −0.03 −0.24 0.21 0.42 −0.21 −2.01
L Industrial org 0.67 0.80 −0.13 −0.69 0.63 0.76 −0.13 −0.76
MMarketing/accounting 0.24 0.22 0.03 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.71
N Economic history 0.25 0.34 −0.09 −0.69 0.24 0.31 −0.07 −0.58
O Development 1.08 0.73 0.34 1.21 1.14 0.80 0.34 1.14
P Economic systems 0.10 0.11 −0.01 −0.18 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.63
Q Agri., environment 0.20 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.33 0.13 0.20 2.17
R Regional, transport 0.19 0.20 −0.01 −0.19 0.15 0.26 −0.10 −1.65
Z Special topics 0.27 0.20 0.06 0.70 0.22 0.26 −0.03 −0.38
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. First panel shows pre-match summary statistics. t-values for diﬀerences reported in
columns four and seven.
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Table D.: Co-variate post-match balance when Dik ̸= 0
Gunning Fog SMOG
Discrimination Discrimination
Against
women
Against
men Diﬀerence t
Against
women
Against
men Diﬀerence t
T 4.96 4.42 0.54 1.10 5.09 4.46 0.63 1.24
Avg. Nit 2.28 2.24 0.03 0.35 2.28 2.26 0.02 0.25
Min. order in issue 2.94 2.56 0.38 1.12 2.89 2.58 0.30 0.89
% ﬁrst authored by i 3.14 3.04 0.10 0.06 3.23 3.46 −0.24 −0.15
Max. citations 234.84 340.37 −105.53 −1.46 237.73 340.77 −103.04 −1.42
Max. inst. rank 47.76 48.33 −0.57 −0.22 47.38 48.63 −1.25 −0.48
Avg. year 2001.99 2003.64 −1.65 −1.25 2002.00 2003.76 −1.76 −1.35
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.13
1970–79 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.55 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.88
1980–89 0.13 0.07 0.06 1.53 0.13 0.06 0.06 1.78
1990–99 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.53
2000–09 0.42 0.41 0.01 0.22 0.42 0.42 0.00 −0.07
2010–15 0.25 0.32 −0.07 −1.43 0.25 0.33 −0.07 −1.43
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.35 0.42 −0.07 −1.43 0.35 0.41 −0.06 −1.35
Econometrica 0.16 0.17 −0.01 −0.15 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.04
JPE 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.82 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.51
QJE 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.95 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.92
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
B Methodology 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
C Quant. methods 0.52 0.66 −0.14 −0.76 0.54 0.63 −0.09 −0.48
D Microeconomics 1.58 1.58 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.57 0.03 0.09
E Macroeconomics 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.54 −0.13 −0.84
F International 0.24 0.25 −0.01 −0.11 0.24 0.33 −0.09 −0.64
G Finance 0.47 0.56 −0.09 −0.47 0.52 0.53 −0.01 −0.07
H Public 0.57 0.46 0.11 0.93 0.70 0.46 0.24 1.41
I Health, welfare, edu 1.30 0.90 0.41 1.21 1.33 0.89 0.44 1.32
J Labour 1.61 1.32 0.29 1.01 1.71 1.29 0.42 1.34
K Law and econ 0.25 0.32 −0.06 −0.60 0.25 0.32 −0.06 −0.60
L Industrial org 0.61 0.68 −0.08 −0.45 0.65 0.73 −0.09 −0.51
MMarketing/accounting 0.29 0.11 0.18 1.71 0.29 0.10 0.19 1.84
N Economic history 0.22 0.35 −0.14 −1.10 0.20 0.35 −0.15 −1.20
O Development 1.11 0.82 0.29 0.92 1.09 0.81 0.28 0.88
P Economic systems 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.48 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.48
Q Agri., environment 0.28 0.15 0.13 1.35 0.27 0.18 0.09 0.92
R Regional, transport 0.16 0.24 −0.08 −1.14 0.19 0.24 −0.05 −0.74
Z Special topics 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.67 0.29 0.22 0.08 0.80
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. First panel shows pre-match summary statistics. t-values for diﬀerences reported in
columns four and seven.
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Table D.: Co-variate post-match balance when Dik ̸= 0
Dale-Chall
Discrimination
Against
women
Against
men Diﬀerence t
T 5.04 4.90 0.14 0.25
Avg. Nit 2.29 2.26 0.03 0.29
Min. order in issue 2.77 2.54 0.24 0.71
% ﬁrst authored by i 1.80 3.26 −1.46 −1.08
Max. citations 205.15 395.77 −190.62 −2.36
Max. inst. rank 46.48 50.23 −3.75 −1.45
Avg. year 2001.59 2002.99 −1.40 −0.95
Fraction of articles per decade
1950–59 0.00 0.00 0.00
1960–69 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.42
1970–79 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.33
1980–89 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.83
1990–99 0.17 0.19 −0.02 −0.52
2000–09 0.37 0.40 −0.03 −0.59
2010–15 0.28 0.29 −0.01 −0.19
Fraction of articles per journal
AER 0.37 0.39 −0.01 −0.30
Econometrica 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.51
JPE 0.23 0.20 0.03 0.65
QJE 0.26 0.30 −0.04 −0.82
Fraction of articles per JEL code
A General 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −1.00
B Methodology 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
C Quant. methods 0.45 0.54 −0.08 −0.59
D Microeconomics 1.58 1.79 −0.21 −0.77
E Macroeconomics 0.58 0.52 0.06 0.31
F International 0.44 0.23 0.21 1.37
G Finance 0.41 0.59 −0.18 −1.07
H Public 0.66 0.45 0.21 1.16
I Health, welfare, edu 1.21 1.04 0.17 0.47
J Labour 1.55 1.69 −0.14 −0.39
K Law and econ 0.21 0.34 −0.13 −1.18
L Industrial org 0.58 0.70 −0.13 −0.72
MMarketing/accounting 0.24 0.18 0.06 0.48
N Economic history 0.23 0.32 −0.10 −0.70
O Development 1.30 0.93 0.37 0.99
P Economic systems 0.20 0.08 0.11 1.24
Q Agri., environment 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.90
R Regional, transport 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.20
Z Special topics 0.32 0.23 0.10 0.96
Notes. Sample restricted to authors with three or more publications. First panel shows pre-match
summary statistics. t-values for diﬀerences reported in columns four and seven.
62
D.6 Section 3.4.3, R̂it regression output. Table D.9 displays output from time- and
gender-speciﬁc regressions used to generate R̂it. (Output for male authors at t = 1 not
shown.)
Table D.: Regression output generating R̂it
Flesch Reading Ease Flesch-Kincaid
Women Men Women Men
t = 1 t = 3 t = 3 t = 1 t = 3 t = 3
Female ratio 4.36 3.89 0.01 −0.09 0.74 1.40
(7.68) (5.96) (7.56) (1.59) (1.21) (1.65)
N 1.33 0.14 −0.32 −0.01 −0.07 −0.03
(2.47) (1.89) (1.34) (0.51) (0.38) (0.29)
Inst. rank −0.03 −0.15* 0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.02
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Max. inst. rank 0.07 0.18 −0.09 0.01 0.03 −0.02
(0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Max. tj −0.57* −0.23 −0.06 −0.06 0.00 −0.06
(0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Year 0.21 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Econometrica −3.03 −4.25 −0.06 −1.37* −0.80 −0.73
(3.90) (3.10) (3.43) (0.81) (0.63) (0.75)
JPE 1.05 1.63 5.66* 0.19 0.16 0.18
(3.39) (3.34) (3.21) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70)
QJE 4.95 0.38 5.50** 0.38 −0.31 0.64
(3.05) (2.66) (2.62) (0.63) (0.54) (0.57)
Constant −389.75 −23.30 −364.60 −97.19* −75.18 −83.72
(265.17) (262.33) (250.38) (55.07) (53.33) (54.61)
Notes. Sample 121 female authors; 104 male authors. Sample restricted to matched authors. See Section 3.4.3 for details on how matches
were made. Regressions weighted by the frequency observations are used in a match. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.: Regression output generating R̂it
Gunning Fog SMOG Dale-Chall
Women Men Women Men Women Men
t = 1 t = 3 t = 3 t = 1 t = 3 t = 3 t = 1 t = 3 t = 3
Female ratio −0.85 1.14 3.07 −0.36 0.90 2.43* 0.28 0.31 0.82
(1.93) (1.50) (1.91) (1.40) (1.11) (1.35) (0.61) (0.58) (0.68)
N −0.10 −0.05 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 −0.05 0.07
(0.62) (0.47) (0.34) (0.45) (0.35) (0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12)
Inst. rank 0.01 −0.02 −0.03** 0.00 −0.02 −0.02** −0.01 −0.02** −0.02***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Max. inst. rank 0.01 0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Max. tj −0.11 0.00 −0.01 −0.10 −0.01 0.01 −0.04 −0.02 0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02** −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Econometrica −1.65* −1.32* −0.68 −0.78 −0.96* −0.40 −0.61* −0.45 0.22
(0.98) (0.78) (0.87) (0.71) (0.58) (0.61) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
JPE −0.11 0.29 0.66 −0.04 0.40 0.62 −0.11 0.25 0.57*
(0.85) (0.84) (0.81) (0.62) (0.62) (0.57) (0.27) (0.33) (0.29)
QJE 0.65 −0.42 1.15* 0.61 −0.23 0.81* 0.46* 0.30 0.77***
(0.77) (0.67) (0.66) (0.56) (0.49) (0.47) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23)
Constant −101.85 −60.54 −106.83* −90.57* −43.47 −87.51* −58.39*** 11.32 −33.49
(66.54) (65.93) (63.35) (48.45) (48.80) (44.59) (20.94) (25.56) (22.46)
Notes. Sample 121 female authors; 104 male authors. Sample restricted to matched authors. See Section 3.4.3 for details on how matches were made. Regressions weighted by the frequency
observations are used in a match. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
64
D.7 Section 3.4.3, list ofmatched pairs. Table D.15 displays the names of the economists
in each matched pair.
Table D.: Matched pairs
Matched pairs Matched pairs
Female Male Female Male
Abraham, Katharine G. Rhee, Changyong La Ferrara, Eliana Bó, Pedro Dal
Admati, Anat R. Rhee, Changyong Landes, Elisabeth M. Friedman, David
Amiti, Mary Salvanes, Kjell G. Levy, Gilat Strumpf, Koleman S.
Anderson, Siwan Michalopoulos, Stelios Lewis, Karen K. Gale, William G.
Ashraf, Nava Seshadri, Ananth Li, Wei Strumpf, Koleman S.
Athey, Susan Kmenta, Jan Lleras-Muney, Adriana von Wachter, Till
Baicker, Katherine Van Reenen, John Løken, Katrine Vellesen Gertler, Paul J.
Bailey, Martha J. Doepke, Matthias Madrian, Brigitte C. Hassler, John
Bandiera, Oriana Staiger, Douglas O. Maestas, Nicole Naidu, Suresh
Barwick, Panle Jia Goyal, Sanjeev Malmendier, Ulrike Rubinfeld, Daniel L.
Baxter, Marianne Fershtman, Chaim Matzkin, Rosa L. Mullainathan, Sendhil
Bedard, Kelly Mahajan, Aprajit McConnell, Sheena Oyer, Paul
Bertrand, Marianne Ray, Edward John McGrattan, Ellen R. Flinn, Christopher J.
Black, Sandra E. Cahuc, Pierre Meyer, Margaret A. Gennaioli, Nicola
Blank, Rebecca M. Naidu, Suresh Molinari, Francesca Vermeulen, Frederic
Boustan, Leah Platt Pope, Devin G. Moser, Petra Dahl, Gordon B.
Brown, Jennifer Gale, William G. Nakamura, Emi Snowberg, Erik
Busse, Meghan R. La Porta, Rafael Ng, Serena Renault, Eric
Case, Anne C. Thomson, William Niederle, Muriel Board, Simon
Casella, Alessandra Mendelsohn, Robert Oster, Emily Kremer, Michael
Chen, Xiaohong Wilson, John Douglas Pande, Rohini Kane, Thomas J.
Chen, Yan Irwin, Douglas A. Paxson, Christina H. Pauzner, Ady
Chevalier, Judith A. Eliaz, Kﬁr Perrigne, Isabelle Rhee, Changyong
Chichilnisky, Graciela Hubbard, Thomas N. Piazzesi, Monika Kahn, James A.
Correia, Isabel Bohn, Henning Qian, Nancy Kahn, Matthew E.
Costa, Dora L. Dorn, David Quinzii, Martine Williams, Steven R.
Cropper, Maureen L. Strahan, Philip E. Ramey, Valerie A. Evans, Paul
Currie, Janet Kosfeld, Michael Reinganum, Jennifer F. Manski, Charles F.
Dafny, Leemore S. Xu, Daniel Yi Reinhart, Carmen M. Lefgren, Lars
De Nardi, Mariacristina Kosfeld, Michael Rey, Hélène Waugh, Michael E.
Demange, Gabrielle Roemer, John E. Romer, Christina D. Cooley, Thomas F.
Duﬂo, Esther Bettinger, Eric P. Rose, Nancy L. Snowberg, Erik
Dupas, Pascaline Kremer, Michael Rose-Ackerman, Susan Mookherjee, Dilip
Dynan, Karen E. Wiggins, Steven N. Rosenblat, Tanya S. Guryan, Jonathan
Eberly, Janice C. Einav, Liran Rouse, Cecilia Elena Black, Dan A.
Eckel, Catherine C. Grinblatt, Mark S. Sapienza, Paola Verdier, Thierry
Edlund, Lena van Wijnbergen, Sweder Schennach, Susanne M. Burnside, Craig
Eyigungor, Burcu McClellan, Mark B. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie Woodford, Michael
Fan, Yanqin Matsusaka, John G. Schwartz, Nancy L. Shimer, Robert
Fernández, Raquel Svensson, Jakob Shannon, Chris Williams, Steven R.
Field, Erica Kremer, Michael Shaw, Kathryn L. Gould, Eric D.
Finkelstein, Amy Sacerdote, Bruce I. Spier, Kathryn E. Chay, Kenneth Y.
Flavin, Marjorie A. Eyster, Erik Stokey, Nancy L. Hynes, J. Allan
Forges, Françoise Christensen, Laurits R. Tenreyro, Silvana Skinner, Jonathan
Fortin, Nicole M. Sacerdote, Bruce I. Tertilt, Michèle Hyslop, Dean R.
Freund, Caroline Bernard, Andrew B. Tesar, Linda L. Meyer, Bruce D.
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola Marcet, Albert Thomas, Julia K. Rhee, Changyong
Garﬁnkel, Michelle R. Finan, Frederico Todd, Petra E. Sanders, Seth G.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou Burstein, Ariel Tomás Vissing-Jørgensen, Annette MacLeod, W. Bentley
Goldin, Claudia D. Boldrin, Michele Voena, Alessandra Donohue, John J. (III)
Gopinath, Gita Chetty, Raj Washington, Ebonya L. Oyer, Paul
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Table D.15 (continued)
Matched pairs Matched pairs
Female Male Female Male
Griﬃth, Rachel Oreopoulos, Philip White, Lucy Strumpf, Koleman S.
Guerrieri, Veronica Hillman, Arye L. Whited, Toni M. Jansson, Michael
Hanna, Rema Möbius, Markus M. Williams, Heidi L. Rockoﬀ, Jonah E.
Hastings, Justine S. Ferrie, Joseph P. Wooders, Myrna Holtz Isaac, R. Mark
Ho, Katherine Nunn, Nathan Yariv, Leeat Finan, Frederico
Hoxby, Caroline Minter Goldfarb, Avi Yellen, Janet L. Rogerson, Richard
Jayachandran, Seema Dahl, Gordon B. Zeiler, Kathryn McAdams, David
Kowalski, Amanda E. Munshi, Kaivan Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina Knittel, Christopher R.
Kranton, Rachel E. Rockoﬀ, Jonah E. İmrohoroğlu, Ayşe Kircher, Philipp
Kuziemko, Ilyana Graham, Bryan S.
Notes. Table lists the names of the matched pairs from Section 3.4.3. In each panel, female members are listed ﬁrst; male members second.
Matches were made using a probit model with replacement. See Section 3.4.3 for details on the matching process.
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D.8 Table X, male eﬀects, Equation (12) and Condition 1. Table D.16 estimates Dik
with Equation (12). Table X estimates Dik with a rough attempt to control for acceptance
rates—it requires Ti ≤ Tk or Tk ≤ Ti before categorising matched pairs as discrimination
against i or k, respectively. Conclusions from both tables are are similar to those presented
in Section 3.4.3. Table D.18 shows R̂k3 for men in the matched sample. Grade-level eﬀects
(Flesch-Kincaid, Gunning Fog, SMOG and Dale-Chall) have been multiplied by negative
one (Section 2.1).
Table D.: Dik, Equation (12)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 10.51 8.55 58 −9.06 8.19 21 3.87*** 3.20***
(1.09) (1.16)
Flesch Kincaid 2.04 1.80 61 −1.14 1.45 25 0.85*** 0.68***
(0.22) (0.24)
Gunning Fog 3.05 2.16 62 −1.85 1.87 17 1.40*** 1.20***
(0.27) (0.29)
SMOG 2.07 1.60 63 −1.53 1.50 16 0.91*** 0.77***
(0.19) (0.21)
Dale-Chall 0.90 0.68 48 −0.53 0.49 23 0.26*** 0.20**
(0.08) (0.09)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (104 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). First and second panels display conditional
means, standard deviations and observation counts ofDik (Equation (12)) from subpopulations of matched pairs in which the woman
or man, respectively, satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2. Third panel displays mean Dik over all observations. To account for the 30–40
percent of pairs for which Theorem 1 is inconclusive, (1) sets Dik = 0, while (2) sets Dik = R̂i3 − R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i
female, k male) and zero, otherwise. Male scores are subtracted from female scores;Dik is positive in panel one and negative in panel
two. Dik weighted by frequency observations are used in a match; degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses (panel
three, only). ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table D.: Dik, proxying for acceptance rates (Condition 3)
Discrimination against
women (Dik > 0)
Discrimination against
men (Dik < 0)
Mean, all
observations
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (1) (2)
Flesch Reading Ease 15.38 10.43 40 −11.65 11.50 12 5.49*** 4.65***
(1.59) (1.69)
Flesch Kincaid 2.98 2.00 40 −2.03 2.34 12 1.15*** 0.92**
(0.34) (0.37)
Gunning Fog 4.24 2.69 44 −3.57 2.86 9 1.76*** 1.51***
(0.42) (0.45)
SMOG 3.03 1.92 45 −2.90 2.18 8 1.26*** 1.09***
(0.30) (0.32)
Dale-Chall 1.80 1.35 30 −0.91 0.56 15 0.45*** 0.38**
(0.16) (0.17)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (104 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). First and second panels display conditional
means, standard deviations and observation counts ofDik (Equation (11)) from subpopulations of matched pairs in which the woman
or man, respectively, satisﬁes Conditions 1–3. Third panel displays meanDik over all observations. To account for the 30–40 percent
of pairs for which Theorem 1 is inconclusive, (1) sets Dik = 0, while (2) sets Dik = R̂i3 − R̂k3 if R̂i3 < R̂k3 (i female, k
male) and zero, otherwise. Male scores are subtracted from female scores;Dik is positive in panel one and negative in panel two. Dik
weighted by frequency observations are used in a match; degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses (panel three,
only). ***, ** and * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table D.: Mean R̂k3 (men)
Flesch
Reading
Ease
Flesch-
Kincaid
Gunning
Fog SMOG
Dale-
Chall
R̂k3 (men) 36.83 −13.95 −18.32 −16.00 −11.54
(1.114) (0.243) (0.282) (0.198) (0.100)
Notes. Sample 121 matched pairs (104 and 121 distinct men and women, respectively). Figures correspond
to the t = 3 reconstructed readability scores for men. R̂i3 weighted by frequency observations are used in a
match; degrees-of-freedom corrected standard errors in parentheses.
D.9 Table XI, alternative thresholds for motherj . Table D.19 repeats the regression pre-
sented in Table XI column (5), using alternative age thresholds to deﬁne motherhood:
motherj equals 1 if paper j ’s co-authors are all mothers to children younger than three (ﬁrst
column), four (second column), etc. Changing this threshold has little eﬀect on female
ratio’s coeﬃcient. The coeﬃcients on motherj and birthj are persistently negative and pos-
itive (respectively), although magnitudes and standard errors vary. Remaining coeﬃcients
are unaﬀected.
Table D.: Table XI, alternative thresholds for motherj
Age < 3 Age < 4 Age < 5 Age < 10 Age < 18
Female ratio 5.653*** 6.341*** 6.654*** 6.562*** 6.335***
(2.102) (2.097) (2.150) (2.175) (2.225)
Mother −3.673 −11.068*** −10.934*** −8.914** −5.550
(2.327) (3.599) (3.212) (3.495) (3.399)
Birth 1.317 7.999* 7.579* 5.651 2.518
(3.784) (4.464) (4.167) (4.402) (4.126)
Max. tj −0.163** −0.165** −0.163** −0.163** −0.162**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
No. pages 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.179***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
N 1.005** 0.979** 0.970** 0.968** 0.975**
(0.443) (0.443) (0.443) (0.444) (0.445)
Order 0.221** 0.220** 0.220** 0.218** 0.219**
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
No. citations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 37.732*** 37.866*** 37.892*** 37.866*** 37.781***
(2.049) (2.054) (2.057) (2.059) (2.047)
Editor eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Year eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Institution eﬀects 3 3 3 3 3
Notes. Sample 2,626 articles. Coeﬃcients from OLS estimation of Equation (13) at diﬀerent age thresholds for motherj . In column one,
motherj equals one for papers authored exclusively by women with children younger than three; in column two, the age threshold is four;
etc. Column three corresponds to results presented in Table XI. Standard errors clustered by year in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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